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ABSTRACT
In Part 1, I study over 10,000 OTC securities that are organized into one of three tiered
marketplaces (OTCQX, OTCQB, and OTC Pink) based on the quality and quantity of
information a firm makes available. My analysis adds to the literature by providing a more
complete picture of trading in this market. I examine determinants of trading within the tiers and
compare trading metrics of the biggest return winners and losers during the sample period. I also
examine if day-of-the week effects previously documented for listed securities exist in the OTC
market. A large portion of these securities are penny stocks trading under five dollars per share.
In Part 2, I compare penny stock behavior across price partitions and OTC marketplace tiers. I
also compare market quality metrics of penny stocks trading OTC to those of listed securities
priced five dollars and under. I document positive externalities resulting from the lottery-like
features of penny stocks. In particular, I find that OTC penny stocks trade more often than their
non-penny counterparts. However, on average, increased investor interest does not lead to an
improvement in bid-ask spreads for these securities relative to non-penny OTC securities. I also
find that penny stocks designated to higher information tiers are more liquid than penny stocks
designated to lower information tiers. Lastly, in Part 3, I examine short interest in OTC stocks by
price, tier, and stock and firm characteristics to determine the effects of transparency on short
selling in the OTC market. I also study the daily return performances of securities with differing
levels of short interest to determine if OTC securities behave as predicted by a theoretical model
provided by Ang, Shtauber, and Tetlock (2013). I find that larger, more liquid stocks, and stocks
in lower information tiers, are easier to short. Additionally, although American Depository
Receipts (ADRs) tend to display higher levels of institutional participation, these securities are
more difficult to short than common stocks and ordinary shares. Overall, my results provide
support for studies suggesting that the difficulty shorting OTC stocks adds to the lottery-like
features of OTC securities.
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PART 1: SEEING THROUGH THE TIERS: TRADING IN THE MODERN OTC
MARKETPLACE

1

PART 1

INTRODUCTION
Electronic trading continues to produce noticeable liquidity benefits for listed securities.
Modern markets, dominated by institutions and high-frequency trading firms, boast of low
transactions costs, low volatility, and improved market depth and execution speeds (Angel,
Harris, and Spatt, 2013). The over-the-counter (OTC) market, on the other hand, consists
primarily of retail traders. Consequently, OTC securities are extremely illiquid, difficult to short,
and exhibit highly skewed returns (Ang, Shatuaber, Tetlock, 2013; Eraker and Ready, 2015). 1
While liquidity for listed securities has been considered in depth, only a few studies examine
liquidity in the OTC market. The primary goal of my analysis is to study the effects of
information disclosure on market quality in the OTC market, specifically liquidity within the
new OTC information tier designations. In 2007, OTC Markets Group established a tiered
system of marketplaces for securities trading OTC.2 Securities are currently organized into one
of

three

tiered

marketplaces

1

(OTCQX,

OTCQB,

The OTC Markets Group reports that approximately 2,000 institutional investors trade OTC securities. Institutions
hold an average of 26% of OTC stocks (Ang, Shatuaber, and Tetlock, 2013).
2
OTC Market Group is formerly known as the National Quotation Bureau (NQB) and traces its history back to
1904. The NQB was established to aggregate and publish price information for securities trading OTC. Stock
information was distributed on pink sheets of paper, which led to this market being referred to as the “Pink Sheets”.
On April 14, 1997, the NQB was sold. The NQB renamed itself Pink Sheets LLC in July 2000, and subsequently to
Pink OTC Markets Inc. on March 31, 2008, and most recently changed its name to OTC Markets Group Inc. on
January 18, 2011. OTC Markets Group is not a stock exchange nor a self-regulatory organization and is not
regulated by FINRA or the SEC.

2

and OTC Pink) based on the quality and quantity of information firms make available. 3 The
information tier designations of the securities in this study provide an ideal setting to examine
the liquidity effects of information disclosure in the OTC market.
Previous studies suggest that firms providing voluntary disclosure find an improvement
in liquidity, a reduction in cost of capital, and an increase in the number of financial analysts
following a firm (Healy and Palepu, 2001).

Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) find that

information disclosure can reduce a firm’s cost of capital through increased liquidity.
Information disclosure allows shareholders and creditors to evaluate potential returns and
monitor the use of capital (Beyer, Cohen, Lys, and Walther, 2010). Greater transparency
improves market quality and reduces information asymmetry (Welker, 1995; Leuz and
Verrecchia, 2000; and Bushee and Leuz, 2005). Due to reporting and transparency deficiencies
and differences across firms, coupled with extreme prices and the prevalence of retail traders,
price behavior and trading characteristics for OTC securities may differ markedly between tiers.
Retail investors are likely to display greater levels of divergence of opinion, which is magnified
in firms that are opaque and difficult to short (Ang, Shtauber, and Tetlock, 2013). Because
disclosure of information resolves uncertainty and reduces divergence of opinion (Ang,
Shatuaber, and Tetlock, 2013), stocks in higher information tiers should have higher valuations,
trade more frequently, have less volatility and lower trading costs than stocks in lower
information tiers.
My results indicate that firms in higher information tiers trade more frequently and have
lower transaction costs than firms in lower information tiers. I also find that previously
documented liquidity determinants for listed securities hold in the OTC market as well. In
3

In 2013, the SEC recognized two of these tiers, OTCQX and OTCQB, as established public markets (SEC). As of
2015, over 10,000 global securities, with aggregate market capitalizations of $14.6 trillion, trade over $201 billion
(dollar volume) annually in the tiered marketplaces operated by OTC Markets Group.

3

particular, I find that price, volatility, firm size, and competition among market makers are all
significant determinants of firm liquidity. I document securities that move between the tiers
indicating that firms pay attention to the new tier designation standards. After sorting firms on
return performance over the sample period, I compare trading metrics of the top decile of
performers to those in the bottom decile. Firms with the largest returns over the sample period
are less liquid and experience less volatility than the bottom decile of performers. Given the
difference in trader types (i.e. institutional versus retail) between listed and OTC markets, I
examine if day-of-the week effects previously documented for trading metrics in listed securities
are persistent in the OTC market as well. Similar to trading in listed markets, I find that trading
activity is highest on Tuesdays and lowest on Fridays. Overall, my results shed light on the tiers
within the OTC marketplace, which is relevant because firms must pay an application and
ongoing annual fee to be listed on the OTCQB and OTCQX tier, but not on the OTC Pink tier.
It is important to study liquidity given its role in asset pricing and financial decision
making (Chung and Zhang, 2014). Ang, Shtauber, and Tetlock (2013) suggest that OTC
investors are largely concerned about stock liquidity, which in the OTC market includes the
ability to trade a stock at all. Investors may also be interested in OTC stock liquidity based on
evidence that liquidity is priced in stock returns (see, for example, Ang, Shatuaber, and Tetlock,
2013; Amihud and Mendelson, 1986; and Amihud, 2002). Liquidity premiums in the OTC
market may be more taxing than those on securities trading on listed exchanges. The results of
my OTC liquidity analysis are of interest to managers as well. For listed securities, stock
liquidity is shown to be inversely related to cost of capital (Butler, Grullon, and Weston, 2005)
and directly related to firm performance and manager compensation (Fang, Noe, and Tice,
2009). Consequently, if managers of firms trading on listed exchanges value stock market

4

liquidity, then managers of OTC firms may be even more concerned about the market liquidity
of their securities, relative to managers of listed securities. Additionally, the differences in
liquidity between the most liquid firms and least liquid firms in the OTC market may be more
meaningful than similar differences between listed securities. In particular, given that more
liquid firms have a lower cost of capital, a minor increase in liquidity for an OTC security market
could have dramatic consequences on a firm’s cost of capital, especially when compared to
liquid securities trading on listed exchanges.
My results are also interesting in light of recent anecdotal evidence suggesting that some
firms choose to avoid the costs associated with listing and instead choose to trade in the OTC
market. These firms, either by default or design, acknowledge a preference for trading in the
OTC market over the value of greater liquidity that results from trading on a listed exchange. My
analysis of OTC stock liquidity is also valuable to firms both currently trading in this market as
well as to ventures looking for a future trading home. Lastly, this study is unique in that it
provides an opportunity to examine human trading behavior in an environment otherwise
dominated by computers.

5

OTC MARKETPLACE AND TIER DESIGNATIONS
OTC securities are currently organized into a hierarchy of tiers based on the quality and
quantity of information firms make available.4

Companies on OTCQX meet the highest

financial standards required by the OTC Markets Group, are current in their disclosures, are
sponsored by a third-party investment bank or attorney advisor, pay an application and ongoing
annual fees, and have a bid price of at least $0.10.5 Firms within this tier are further classified as
either OTCQX U.S., OTCQX International, or OTCQX Banks. The OTCQX U.S. option is for
“high growth and early stage companies seeking to build a more stable valuation and generate
visibility in the investment community.”6 OTCQX International firms may already be listed on
an international stock exchange and can qualify for this tier by making their home country
disclosures available in English. Firms in this tier are not required to register with the SEC and
can take advantage of SEC Rule 12g3-2b, which allows registration exemptions for some foreign
securities. A majority of securities designated to the OTCQX tier are large international firms.
OTCQX Banks is for established SEC- and non-SEC-reporting regional and community banks.
In total, there are over 400 domestic and international securities, from over 20 countries that
trade in the OTCQX marketplace. These firms represent $1.4 trillion in total market cap and
trade over $36 billion (dollar volume) in 2014, which is a 22% increase over 2013. Firms such

4

The information in this section is primarily obtained from otcmarkets.com.
Sponsors for U.S. companies are called Designated Advisor for Disclosure (“DADs”), while sponsors for
international firms are called a Principal American Liaison (“PALs”). These advisors provide guidance to firms
navigating the publicly traded marketplace.
6
SEC-reporting (non SEC-reporting) companies within this tier provide information through SEC’s EDGAR system
(OTC Disclosure & News Services).
5

6

as Adidas, Air France, Deutsch Telekom, Volkswagen, Heineken, and Technicolor trade in this
tier.
The OTCQB tier is designed for entrepreneurial and development stage firms that do not
qualify for the OTCQX. It was originally designed to identify companies that were current in
their reporting to the SEC or bank/insurance regulator. However, on May 1, 2014, the OTC
Market Group announced new OTCQB designation standards to make it a “true U.S. venture
marketplace for engaged entrepreneurial and development stage companies.” Securities on
OTCQB must be current in their reporting to the SEC or bank/insurance regulator, undergo an
annual verification and management certification process, and pay an application and ongoing
fee. While there are no minimum financial standards, firms must have a minimum bid price of
$0.01, and cannot be in bankruptcy.7 Companies have 120 days from their 2014 fiscal year end
to comply with the new designation standards. With compliance deadlines expiring at the end of
July 2015, the OTC Market Group reports that over 1,000 companies have met the eligibility
requirements for the OTCQB designation.
Either by “default, distress, or design,” any security not designated to the OTCQX or
OTCQB trades in the OTC Pink marketplace.

Bankrupt firms, shell companies, and

development stage companies are designated to the OTC Pink marketplace where there are no
disclosure requirements or financial qualifications.8 OTC Pink firms have variable reporting
standards and are either unable or unwilling to provide adequate information and transparency.
Based on the variety of firms within this tier, the OTC Markets Group further categorizes these
firms into Pink Current Information, Pink Limited Information, or Pink No Information based on
7

Firms must identify company officers, directors, and controlling shareholders, and also confirm total shares
outstanding and total shares authorized.
8
Many OTC stocks have five letter ticker symbols. The fifth character may be used to identify if a firm is in
bankruptcy, delinquent in its filings, or may be used to identify the type of security, class of shares, or if the issue is
a foreign security.
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the level of disclosure. Current Information firms follow one of the allowed reporting standards
and make their filings publicly available through the OTC Disclosure & News Service. 9 Limited
Information firms include companies under financial distress or in bankruptcy, or a firm with
financial reporting problems.

These companies provide financial information via OTC

Disclosure and News Service or have made a filing on EDGAR within the past six months.
Lastly, as the designation suggests, No Information firms either are unable or unwilling to
provide information, or if information is filed, it is older than six months.10 This category
includes defunct companies, along with companies that have questionable management and
disclosure practices. The OTC Market Group reports that 90% of annual dollar volume in this
OTC Pink marketplace is in securities with current information available. While broker-dealers
pay a monthly fee to quote OTC securities, firms trading on OTC Pink do not encounter any
application or ongoing annual fees. To be designated on OTCQX or OTCQB, however, firms
must pay an application fee ($5000 and $2500, respectively) along with ongoing annual fees
($15,000 and $10,000, respectively). Approximately, 9,000 securities do not quote (yet may still
trade) and are designated to the Grey Market. Table 1 provides a summary of the OTCQX,
OTCQB, and OTC Pink tier designation standards.11

9

OTC firms do not have to register with the SEC to trade, even though some OTC companies still file reports with
the SEC (or a banking or insurance regulator). Other reporting firms may file via the OTC Disclosure & News
Service, a platform provided by the OTC Markets Group where companies can provide information to investors.
Companies trading on the OTCQX, OTCQB, and OTC Pink adhere to either an International Information Standard
(Rule 12g3-2b allows non-U.S. companies with stock listed on a non-U.S. exchange to make publicly available the
same information that is reported in their home country), U.S. Reporting Standard (domestic firms that are currently
compliant to SEC or bank/insurance regulator), U.S. Bank Reporting Standard (banks with SEC-registered securities
are current; those not registered with SEC must follow OTCQX rules for banks), or Alternative Reporting Standard
(when SEC registration is not required, companies must still make information publicly available under Rule 10b-5.
10
The SEC requires all companies to provide notice of dividends, stock splits, name changes, mergers and
acquisitions, dissolutions, bankruptcies or liquidations ten days prior to the record date. The only way to be
removed from one of the tiers is for all broker-dealers to stop quoting the security.
11
All tables and figures are placed in the Appendix of each chapter of the dissertation.
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TRADING
Companies can choose to avoid the costs of listing on an exchange and trade on the OTC.
Thus, unlike listed firms on a primary exchange (such as the NYSE or NASDAQ), securities
trading in the OTC marketplace are not “listed” and do not trade in a central exchange. They are
either quoted by a broker-dealer or not quoted. OTC firms thus do not apply to trade in the OTC
marketplace. Instead, at least one broker-dealer must file Form 211 with FINRA to begin
quoting a firm.12 Broker-dealers must be FINRA members and registered with the SEC, and are
also subject to different state securities regulation designed to prevent fraud (i.e. blue-sky laws).
Some brokers may not be willing to quote a new security initially, but instead wait for the stock
to become “piggyback qualified” 30 days after another broker-dealer files Form 211. An OTC
security may quote on FINRA’s OTC Bulletin Board (OTCBB) and/or on the OTC Markets
Group Alternative Trading System (ATS), OTC Link ATS.13 While only SEC-reporting firms
are eligible to quote on the OTCBB, no such restriction exists for firms that quote on the OTC
Link ATS. OTC Link ATS quotes 99% of the OTCBB-eligible securities and has effectively
replaced the OTCBB.14 Additionally, the OTC Link ATS is the only quotation and trading

12

There are exceptions to this. For example, if a delisted firm is already quoted by a broker-dealer, that security may
be OTC eligible immediately.
13
The OTC Link ATS is registered with the SEC and is operated by OTC Link LLC, a subsidiary of OTC Markets
Group. On April 15, 2010, the OTC Market Group formed Pink Link ATS. On March 5, 2012, OTC Link became a
registered broker-dealer and as of June 1, 2012 is operating as an SEC registered ATS. OTC Link ATS is regulated
by FINRA and the SEC. In September of 1999, the NQB first introduced its an electronic quotation system to
provide real-time quotes to broker-dealers.
14
On July 9, 2014 FINRA proposed to cease operation of the OTCBB. In terms of market quality, Bruggemann,
Kaul, Leuz, and Werner (2013) find that as a result of the new tiered regimes, the “Pink Sheets” has essentially
caught up, if not surpassed OTCBB. By the end of their sample period, less than 1% of OTC firms quote
exclusively on OTCBB. Bushee and Leuz (2005) state that it is cheaper for market makers to quote low-volume
stocks on the Pink Sheets than on OTCBB.

9

system available for OTC securities. The OTC Link ATS offers real-time prices and links
broker-dealers together so they can provide a trading experience similar to that of the NYSE or
NASDAQ.15 OTC Link ATS connects over 120 broker-dealers including Archipelago, BNY
Mellon, Citadel, Credit Suisse, JP Morgan, Merrill Lynch, and UBS. These broker-dealers’ OTC
securities dealings are subject to FINRA Rules 5310 (best execution), 5320 (customer priority),
6460 (limit order display), 5220 and 6433 (quote integrity), 4560 (short position disclosure),
6622 (real-time trade reporting), and IM-2110 (no trades at prices better than or equal to
customer limit orders), among others, just as their dealings in listed securities. Investors can
place limit and market orders and trade through a variety of institutional, online, or retail brokerdealers. Broker-dealers may trade directly with other broker-dealers or execute trades internally.
Trades must be reported within 30 seconds of execution.

15

Unlike listed securities, there are typically no trading halts for the dissemination of (OTC) company news.
Although free to trade anytime, trading typically occurs from 6 AM to 5 PM. Most trading activity occurs between
9:30 AM and 4 PM, Eastern Time. The OTC Markets Group even provides an opening bell ceremony similar to the
NYSE called “Light up the Market.” Unlike the NYSE, “Light up the Market” is a virtual, socially-enabled
marketing and photo opportunity (available to OTCQX firms).

10

LITERATURE REVIEW
Given the small stream of literature examining the OTC market, I provide a
comprehensive overview of research examining the OTC market and/or OTC securities. Only a
few studies consider the OTC tier-based designations (Bruggemann, Kaul, Luez, and Werner,
2013; Jiang, Petroni, and Wang, 2013; and Litvak, 2009). Bruggemann, Kaul, Luez, and Werner
find that investors pay attention to the information differences across firms and venues and
transact accordingly. They fail to find return differences between the OTC information tiers and
explain their results through retail investors’ preferences for lottery-like assets coupled with
short-sale constraints. They argue that sophisticated investors may withdraw from the market as
a result, which makes it more difficult to price securities and, in turn, find return differences
between the different information tiers. Bruggemann, Kaul, Leuz, and Werner believe the lower
market quality they document is a result of low investor participation, and conclude that OTC
firms tend to be small penny stocks with negative average returns and high return volatility (i.e.
assets with lottery-like payoffs). Jiang, Petroni, and Wang look at the introduction of the tiered
system and find that firms designated as Pink Sheet Current Information (No Information)
experience an increase (decrease) in liquidity. Neither Bruggemann, Kaul, Luez, and Werner nor
Jiang, Petroni, and Wang consider OTCQX firms because there are so few firms designated to
this tier at the end of their sample periods. In a similar vein, Litvak finds that firms designated to
the low disclosure tiers experience significant negative returns. Litvak states that the new tiers
do not generate new information, but instead only summarize information that is already publicly
available. Litvak proposes that her results are due specifically to firms’ tier designations, not
11

underlying firm fundamentals and concludes that “prominent summaries of public information
can affect stock prices.”
The relation between increased information disclosure and reduced information
asymmetry is supported by Bushee and Leuz (2005) who find that a regulatory change requiring
OTCBB firms to comply with reporting requirements under the 1934 Securities Exchange Act
leads to greater liquidity for some OTC firms. These results are in line with other studies that
find reductions in information asymmetry (and increases in market quality) resulting from
increases in levels of disclosure (see, for example, Welker, 1995; Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000;
Marosi and Massoud 2007).
Other studies consider OTC stock liquidity, but typically examine liquidity immediately
after a firm is delisted from an exchange and subsequently trades OTC (see, for example, Angel,
Harris, Panchapagesan, and Werner, 2004; and Macey, O’Hara, and Pompilio, 2008). If the
average closing price of a security listed on the NYSE or Nasdaq trades below one dollar over a
consecutive 30-day period, that security may be delisted by the exchange. Macey, O’Hara, and
Pompilio find that the failure to maintain the one dollar minimum share price is the most
common reason Nasdaq firms are delisted, and the second most common reason NYSE firms are
delisted. After a firm is delisted, market quality deteriorates. Share prices and volume fall,
while quoted and effective spreads and volatility increase (Harris, Panchapagesan, and Werner,
2008; and Macey, O’Hara, and Pompilio, 2008). However, Macey, O’Hara, and Pompilio find
that larger delisted NYSE firms moving to the OTC market are less affected than smaller firms.
Dollar spreads for the larger delisted firms actually decline, partly as a result of the minimum
tick size increments in each marketplace (one cent on the NYSE and sub-pennies in the OTC).
Angel, Harris, Pauchapogesan, and Werner study involuntary delistings and find that the further

12

down the market hierarchy a firm falls during the delisting process, the greater the decline in its
liquidity.
Overall, results from previous studies consistently find a reduction in liquidity and an
increase in volatility around the delisting. By design, most of these studies pick up only a small
portion of stocks trading OTC. Delisted firms typically have severe corporate issues and thus
delistings are usually associated with negative events, negative returns, or poor future
opportunities (see Shumway, 1997; Shumway and Warther, 1999; Marosi and Massoud, 2007;
Leuz, Triantis, Wang, 2008). While firms with financial issues and reporting deficiencies trade
in the OTC marketplace, there are many companies that are healthy, stable, and transparent. My
analysis aims to provide a more complete picture of the OTC market by examining both stable
and problematic OTC firms.
OTC asset pricing studies are also relevant to this study. Eraker and Ready (2014) find
that the distribution of OTC stock returns is highly positively skewed. While most OTC stocks
have negative average returns, some do well. They attribute this negative return premium for
OTC securities to investors’ preference for positively skewed lottery-like assets. These lottery
preferences cost investors approximately one hundred and eighty billion dollars over their
sample period. Ang, Shtauber, and Tetlock (2013) study OTC securities priced over one dollar
and find that relative to listed stocks, OTC stocks have less intuitional investors, are more
illiquid, and disclose less information. While the size, value, and volatility return premiums are
similar to listed markets, the OTC market has an illiquidity (momentum) premium that is higher
(lower) than in listed markets. Additionally, these authors state that OTC traders are primarily
retail investors who may not pay attention to firms’ fundamentals. Using Barber and Odean’s
discount brokerage house data, Nofsinger and Varma (2014) find that OTC investors are older

13

and more affluent, have more investing experience, trade more, and tend to have greater portfolio
diversification than those that do not invest in OTC securities. Nofsinger and Varma also state
that OTC investors, as a whole, do not seem to have the same characteristics as a lottery-seeking
clientele, even though OTC stock returns are highly positively skewed. However, they find that
investors in penny stocks (here, securities priced one dollar and under) are less affluent males
who tend to have preferences for lottery like stocks. In sum, the authors conclude that investors
in penny stocks seem to have different characteristics and trading behavior than investors in
other OTC stocks priced over one dollar.
Analysts do not typically follow OTC stocks. Additionally, OTC stocks rarely receive
media attention. The attention they receive is usually negative in nature, typically related to
fraudulent activity, a spam campaign, or a “pump and dump” scheme. Freider and Zittrain
(2007) find that stock spam impacts prices and that trading volume is directly related to spam emails.16 Stocks earn positive returns on days prior to spam e-mails, but negative returns in the
days after. Hanke and Hauser (2008) and Hu, McInish, and Zeng (2009) also find that stock
spam campaigns impact prices and trading volume. Hu, McInish, and Zeng (2010) look at the
content of spam emails and find that emails containing a short-term price target generate
abnormal returns and trading volume. Bollen and Christie (2009) look at periods of extreme
volume and volatility possibly induced by information shocks or “pump and dump” schemes.
While they find average cumulative returns are over 20%, they do not find evidence of a
continuation or reversal and suggest that “a large fraction of extreme volume periods reflect
changes

in

fundamentals

rather

16

than

manipulation.”

Freider and Zittrain describe the spam process: “Stock-touting spam asks a user to invest in a specific stock, and
often concedes in its fine print that the spammer has a financial interest in touting those stocks. When [the investor]
in a stock in which the spammer (or the spammer’s client) holds a stake, spam recipients can maintain or drive up
the price during the spammer’s selling so that the stock can be liquidated at a profit.”

14

DATA AND SAMPLE
Data in this study is provided by the OTC Markets Group and covers all trading days
beginning February 18th, 2014, and ending March 6, 2015. The data contains comprehensive
end-of-day/closing trade and quote information. The file is similar to daily CRSP files, but
identifies information specific to OTC firms including tier designation, third-party sponsors, and
a caveat emptor flag, among other items. OTC Markets Group also provides a security data file
for February 18th, 2014, and March 6th, 2015, which contains shares outstanding.
There are a wide variety of global securities trading in the OTC marketplace, some of
which are highly illiquid and trade infrequently during the sample period. Standard filters
applied in studies of listed securities are not appropriate for an analysis of OTC securities.
Additionally, previous studies of OTC securities restrict attention to only U.S. firms of certain
market caps, prices, and levels of trading, thereby removing some of the variation in this
marketplace.

For example, Eraker and Ready (2015) exclude non-US stocks, ADRs, and

securities priced under $0.01. Bruggemann, Kaul, Luez, and Werner (2013) exclude firms
incorporated outside the US. Ang, Shtauber, and Tetlock (2013) require stocks to trade over
$1.00 and have a market cap of at least $1 million. Since the OTC marketplace is home to
numerous international firms and securities, I include all domestic and international firms of
differing market caps and price levels that trade at least ten times during the sample period, but
partition the data to more fully understand the activity of the average security within each
partition. I consider all common stocks, ordinary shares, or American Depository Receipts
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(ADRs), without additional restrictions on type or size.17 ADRs tend to be larger OTC securities
and have more institutional ownership than non ADRs (Jiang, Petroni, and Wang, 2013). To be
included in my analysis, I require a firm to report shares outstanding on at least one of the two
security data files. In Table 2, I classify the sample of firms according to tier designation and
security type. Because many firms change tiers during the sample period, I provide a snapshot of
the sample on the first and last day trading day during the period. See Panel A and Panel B.
Next, in Panel C, I classify the sample according to average price. Over 70% of the sample are
penny stocks trading under five dollars. Lastly, in Panel D, I classify each price partition
according to tier designation. The largest percentage of firms in each price partition are found in
the OTC Pink tier. Figures 1a and 1b further classify the sample according to price and tier.
While over 70% of the sample has an average closing price below five dollars, over 80% of these
securities have an average price below one dollar.
Table 3 presents summary statistics for the firms in the sample according to tier.
OTCQX (OTCQB, OTC Pink) firms have an average share price of $10.00 ($25.89, $18.29) and
an average daily price range expressed as a percentage of the closing price of 3.75 (9.31, 8.02).
However, when considering median prices, the higher the tier, the greater the price. Next,
considering relative spreads (closing bid-ask spread divided by the closing midpoint), the lower
the tier designation, the higher a firm’s relative spreads. OTCQX have a relative spread of
12.09%, whereas OTCQB’s (OTC Pink’s) average relative spread is 24.96% (34.82%). OTC
stocks are extremely illiquid. To quantify their illiquidity, I use a metric similar to that used by
Ang, Shtauber, and Tetlock (2013), Eraker and Ready (2015) and Bruggemann, Kaul, Luez, and
Werner (2013). Their primary illiquidity measure is PNT, which measures the proportion of

17

ADRs are issued by a U.S. depository bank and provide investors the opportunity to own and trade international
securities in U.S. dollars during normal U.S. trading hours.
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trading days in a month with no volume. This metric measures an “investor’s ability to trade a
stock at all, which is highly relevant in illiquid markets, such as the OTC markets” (Ang,
Shtauber, and Tetlock). I define PNT as the percentage of days during the sample period that a
security does not trade. OTCQX firms trade on more days than OTCQB firms, which trade on
more days than OTC Pink firms. The average OTCQX (OTCQB, OTC Pink) security trades on
approximately 64% (60%, 49%) of the days during the sample period (i.e. PNT is 35.74%,
40.36%, and 51.35%, respectively). The results for PNT are similar to those of Ang, Shatuber,
and Tetlock and Bruggemann, Kaul, Leuz, and Werner. The average number of trades per day
monotonically increases with the information tier. Also, while the average OTCQX firm is
larger than the average OTCQB firm, some OTC Pink firms are extremely large. The average
market capitalization for firms with the OTC Pink designation is greater than firms designated to
OTCQX, although the median value for OTCQX firms is substantially larger than the median
OTC Pink firm.
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ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

OTC Markets Group promotes their marketplace as a minor league system of sorts for the
listed exchanges, stating that some companies use their marketplace to improve their trading,
transparency and trust among investors before moving up to a listed exchange. In 2014, 83
companies graduated to the NYSE, NASDAQ, or NYSE MKT, 22 to the TSX Venture Exchange
in Canada, and five to the LSE AIM Market in the United Kingdom. Over 400 OTC companies
have graduated to a listed exchange over the last five years. Bruggemann, Kaul, Luez, and
Werner (2013) find that around 6% of OTC firms graduate to a listed exchange during their
sample period and conclude that the OTC market is not a “breeding ground for young growth
firms that eventually graduate to the traditional exchanges.” All firms do not make it to the listed
exchanges, of course. From the beginning of the sample period through December 31, 2014, I
find over fifty firms that delist from a U.S. stock exchange and subsequently trade OTC.
While there are firms that move to/from a listed exchange, many OTC securities
frequently move within the tiers of the OTC marketplace. As seen in Table 4, many firms switch
tiers during the sample period, some more than once. 917 firms satisfy the standards of a higher
tier and move up, while 1,430 firms fail to satisfy the reporting requirements of one tier and are
designated to a lower tier. 322 (357) firms that quote (do not quote) in the OTC Pink (Grey
market) stop (begin) quoting during the sample period. 432 firms move from the OTC Pink to
OTCQB, the largest group of the tier risers. On May 1, 2014, OTC Markets Group announced
new designation standards for the OTCQB tier. As a result of these new standards, 1,022
18

different securities in my sample move from OTCQB to OTC Pink. Some firms are serial
changers. Over 20% of firms that switch tiers during the sample period do so more than once.
Two securities change tier designations eight times during the sample, the most of any firms that
switch. Bruggemann, Kaul, Luez, and Werner (2013) find that investors pay attention to the
information differences across firms and venues and transact accordingly. The frequency of the
tier changes I document indicates that some firms pay attention to the different standards and tier
designations as well.
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LIQUIDITY DETERMINANTS
While much is known about the determinants of trading in listed securities, the same does
not hold for OTC securities.

Given that many OTC stocks are penny stocks, the trading

environment may be sufficiently different from that of regular stocks making “generalizations
from penny stocks difficult” (O’Hara, Saar, and Zhong, 2014). Nofsinger and Varma (2014)
document differing trading characteristics of OTC stocks based on different price levels and
suggest that thin trading makes stocks difficult to price and sell. Since many OTC stocks are
extremely illiquid, difficult to short, and display low levels of institutional ownership, relations
between security characteristics and trading metrics are indeterminate. In an analysis of firms
moving from a listed exchange to the OTC market, Macey, O’Hara, and Pompilio (2008) suggest
that trading in different venues has different effects on prices. Consequently, price behavior and
trading behavior for OTC firms may differ among the information tiers as well.

These

differences may be particularly apparent for firms in lower tiers since divergence of opinion
among retail traders may be magnified in firms that are less transparent (Ang, Shtauber, and
Tetlock, 2013). Liquidity is a primary concern in the OTC marketplace, especially considering
that this market consists predominantly of retail traders.

Listed firms in violation of an

exchange’s delisting standards oftentimes provide shareholders a warning of impending OTC
illiquidity, similar to what is presented below by Lantronix Inc. in Form 10-Q filed with the SEC
in 2003:
“If our common stock was delisted…some or all of the following could be reduced,
harming our investors: the liquidity of our common stock; the market price of our
common stock; the number of institutional investors that will consider investing in our
20

common stock; the number of investors in general that will consider investing in our
common stock; the number of market makers in our common stock; the availability of
information concerning the trading prices and volume of our common stock; the number
of broker-dealers willing to execute trades in shares of our common stock; and our ability
to obtain financing for the continuation of our operations….If our common stock were to
be delisted…it could become subject to the SEC ‘Penny Stock’ rules. ‘Penny Stocks’
generally are equity securities with a price of less than $5.00 per share that are not
registered on certain national securities exchanges or quoted on [a listed exchange].
Broker-dealers in our common stock would then be subject to the disclosure rules for
transactions involving penny stocks, which require the broker-dealer to determine if
purchasing our common stock is suitable for a particular investor. The broker-dealer
must also obtain the written consent of purchasers to purchase our common stock. The
broker-dealer must also disclose the best bid and offer prices available for our stock and
the price which the broker-dealer last purchased or sold our common stock. These
additional burdens imposed upon broker-dealers may discourage them from effecting
transactions in our common stock, which could make it difficult for investors to sell their
shares, and hence, limit the liquidity of our common stock.”
I thus begin by analyzing the relation between PNT, percentage of days during the sample
period with no trading, and firm and security characteristics. Schwartz (1988) finds that activity,
risk, information, and competition are common liquidity determinants for listed stocks. More
specifically, Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2000) document common liquidity determinants
that include volatility, volume, and price. I include price, firm size, and volatility as risk proxies,
an SEC dummy variable along with tier designation dummy variables as information proxies,
and the number of market makers quoting a security as a proxy for competition. SEC is an
indicator variable equal to one if the firm is registered with the SEC, zero otherwise. This
variable proxies information disclosure as firms registered with the SEC are required to disclose
important financial information. I also include ADR, an indicator variable equal to one if the
security is an American Depository Receipt, zero otherwise. Jiang, Petroni, and Wang (2013)
state that ADRs tend to be larger OTC securities that have more institutional ownership than non
ADRs. Additionally, OTC ADRs are similar to listed securities (Bollen and Christie, 2009).
While the OTC setting, consisting of primarily retail traders, is extremely different from listed
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exchanges, I hypothesize that activity, competition and information (risk) will be directly
(inversely) related to liquidity. Also, because transparency results in an improvement in liquidity
(see Healy & Palepu, 2001; Welker, 1995; Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; Bushee and Leuz, 2005),
I expect firms in higher information tiers to trade more frequently. I average each independent
variable at the daily level and regress PNT on these firm and security characteristics to determine
the relation of these variables over the sample period. The results for PNT are reported in the
first two panels of Table 5. Since the dependent variable is bounded between 0 and 100, I
present results for a Tobit analysis in Panel A and ordinary least squares (OLS) in Panel B. All
variables are trimmed at the 1% and 99% levels to remove the impact of outliers and possible
data errors.
In both panels, I find that higher priced OTCQX and OTCQB securities trade on fewer
days of the sample period. However, considering only OTC Pink firms, higher priced securities
trade more frequently, as seen in the negative relation to PNT. Across all specifications, stocks
with greater daily price volatility (Range) and stocks with greater levels of competition among
dealers (Mkt Makers) trade more frequently during the sample period. Larger firms tend to be
more liquid as well, as seen in the negative relation between Mkt Cap and PNT. I find a positive
relation between ADR and PNT suggesting that ADR securities are more illiquid than common
stock and foreign ordinaries. This result is surprising given that ADRs are typically larger
securities with more institutional ownership. The variables of interest in this analysis are the tier
designation dummy variables. When adding these indicator variables, I find that OTCQB firms
trade more often than OTC Pink firms (the omitted group). Similarly, the OTCQX dummy is
negative, indicating OTCQX firms have lower levels of PNT (i.e. trade more frequently) than
OTC Pink firms. These results are in line with Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) and Healy and
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Palepu (2001), both studies which indicate that firms providing disclosure find an improvement
in liquidity.
In Panel C and Panel D, I regress a firm’s average number of (daily) trades on the same
independent variables used in the analysis presented in Panels A and B. Panel C (Panel D)
reports the results of a Tobit (OLS) analysis. The results in Panels C and D confirm those found
in the first two panels of Table 5. Unlike in the first two panels, a positive coefficient in Panel C
or Panel D indicates greater liquidity. However, when considering # Trades, higher priced firms
trade less than lower priced firms in all categories except OTC Pink. The SEC indicator variable
is also consistently negative in these panels indicating that firms registered with the SEC trade
less throughout the day than firms not registered with the SEC. This result is in line with other
studies suggesting that OTC investors may have preferences for stocks with lottery features.
Lottery stocks are likely to be priced under one dollar and extremely opaque (Nofsinger and
Varma, 2014).
I next consider another liquidity measure, closing bid-ask spreads. Copeland and Galai
(1983) suggest the bid-ask spread should be inversely related to trading activity. Volume and
number of trades are determinants of bid-ask spreads (Tinic, 1972; Tinic and West, 1972;
Benston and Hagerman, 1974; Branch and Freed, 1977; and Stoll, 1978). Hasbrouck (1988)
suggests that larger trades contain more information. Additionally, previous studies show that
greater competition leads to smaller spreads (Demsetz, 1968; Tinic and West, 1972; Benston and
Hagerman, 1974; Hamilton, 1976, 1978; and Branch and Freed, 1977). Bollen and Christie
(2009) examine quoted spreads of securities trading on the Pink Sheets during 2004 and 2005,
and find that return volatility, trading frequency, and the portion of trades made by a specific
market maker explain bid-ask spreads. I examine similar determinants of bid-ask spreads to see
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how these determinants hold within the OTC information tiers. Firms in higher information tiers
trade more frequently. Coupled with a greater degree of financial transparency, closing bid-ask
spreads should monotonically decrease with higher information tiers. Without trade level data,
closing bid and ask prices provide the best glimpse into trading costs within each tier. The
quotient of the closing bid-ask spread divided by the quote midpoint has a high degree of
correlation with intraday TAQ data for listed securities (Chung and Zhang, 2014). Ang,
Shtauber, and Tetlock (2013) state that the typical OTC investor incurs trading costs of less than
50 basis points per month. Even if trading costs are not significant for the average OTC investor,
transactions costs could “limit the effectiveness of short-horizon arbitrage.” Eraker and Ready
(2015) state that transaction costs are important for any investor. OTC investors, especially
those investing in penny stocks, are significantly affected by transaction costs (Nofsinger and
Varma, 2014).
I regress closing bid-ask spreads on similar security and firm characteristics presented in
Table 5. The results of this analysis are reported in Table 6. As in Table 5, I present the results of
a Tobit (OLS) analysis in Panel A (Panel B), and trim all variables at the 1% and 99% levels. I
find evidence supporting an inverse relation between trading activity and bid-ask spreads, as #
Trades is negative and significant in most regression models. Since information is disseminated
through trading activity, firms that trade more have tighter spreads. I find the Pink and OTCQX
dummy variables are significant in the second regression reported in each panel, suggesting that
bid-ask spreads are greater for OTC Pink securities than OTCQB securities, while those for
OTCQX firms are smaller than OTCQB firms. Greater information disclosure here reduces
closing spread percentages. Range, a price volatility measure, is positive in all regressions.
Greater price volatility is reflected in wider bid-ask spreads, consistent with previous literature. I
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next examine the effects of competition on the closing spreads by considering the number of
broker-dealers quoting a security. In all models, I find an inverse relation between the number of
broker-dealers making a market in a security and relative spreads. Greater competition leads to
smaller spread percentages. Firm size is also a significant determinant in closing spreads. Across
all specifications, I find that larger firms have smaller spreads. I find that firms registered with
the SEC are more illiquid than firms not registered with the SEC. Similar to Table 5, ADRs also
tend to be more illiquid than common stocks or ordinary shares. The coefficient of SEC and ADR
are again surprising, but could be explained through investor preferences for OTC stocks with
lottery-like features.
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LOTTERY WINNERS
The last part of my analysis aims to examine the returns of firms with the largest
(percentage) changes in price. In Table 7, I use a difference-in-means approach to determine
trading differences between the top decile of (return) performers versus the bottom decile of
performers. Eraker and Ready (2015) find that OTC stocks frequently undergo reverse stock
splits. Due to data limitations, I calculate returns for only firms that, in March 2015, report
shares outstanding within 10% of shares outstanding reported in February, 2014. Thus, any
firms that report shares outstanding on only one date during my sample are dropped. I also do
not have information on dividends paid during the sample period, so results in Table 7 should be
interpreted with caution. Additionally, I require a firm to trade in either February or March in
both 2014 and 2015. I also drop the top 1% and 99% of performers due to possible data errors,
and consider the top and bottom deciles of the remaining securities comprised of over 500
securities each. The setup of the return performance test favors finding results primarily for lowpriced securities. The bias towards low-priced securities is difficult to avoid, given that over
70% of OTC stocks are penny stocks, which are natural lottery candidates. However, as a
consequence of the makeup of the sample, I expect the highest decile of return winners and
losers to trade in the OTC Pink tier a trade under $1.00 per share. My results indicate just this: a
large portion of the winners and losers during the sample period are OTC Pink securities that
trade under one dollar. However, 12% of the biggest winners during the sample period are
priced

over

five
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dollars.

In Panel B, after sorting firms on return performance over the sample period, I compare
trading metrics of the top decile of performers to those in the bottom decile. I expect the highest
decile of return winners to be more illiquid than the bottom decile of return performers. My
results are in line with this expectation. The winners are more illiquid and trade less during the
sample period (as seen in Total Trades and PNT). I also find that the portfolio of winners is less
volatile than the portfolio of losers. Previous studies that find greater return volatility for stocks
with lottery-like characteristics sort on return performance prior to measuring subsequent
performance. Since my sort is completed ex-post, my results may not be in conflict with
previous results. Differences in bid-ask spreads and firm size between the two groups are not
statistically different from zero.
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DAY-OF-THE-WEEK-EFFECT
Many academic studies of listed securities find a day-of-the-week effect in some trading
metrics. Kiymaz and Berument (2003), for example, find that volume is highest (lowest) on
Tuesdays (Mondays and Fridays). Similarly, Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2001) find
decreases in trading activity and liquidity on Fridays, but elevated levels on Tuesday. Since
listed markets have higher proportions of institutional participation than the OTC market, I
examine number of trades on each day of the week to find out how these metrics compare
between venues. While the OTC setting consists of primarily retail traders, no theory provides
predictions for other day-of-the-week patterns than that documented for listed securities. While
this pattern could be different, I hypothesize that trading activity is highest on Tuesdays and
lowest on Mondays and Fridays. Even though the OTC market consists primarily of retail
traders, day-of-the-week trading metrics in the OTC market appear similar to those previously
documented for listed securities. As presented in Figure 2, I find that Tuesdays have the highest
number of trades, while Mondays and Fridays have the lowest.18 In untabulated results, I regress
number of trades on day-of-the-week dummy variables and find that Tuesdays (Fridays) have
significantly more (less) trading activity than Wednesdays (the omitted variable).

Trading

activity on Mondays and Thursdays is not statistically different from trading activity on
Wednesdays.

18

These results hold within each OTC tier as well.
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CONCLUSION
The modern OTC marketplace looks dramatically different than it did around the turn of the
century. OTC Markets Group has revitalized this trading space, shedding its Pink Sheets image
and improving trading for both investors and companies alike.

OTC Markets Group now

organizes securities in one of three tiers based on the “integrity of its operations, its level of
disclosure, and its degree of investor engagement.” These tier designations are an attempt to
provide greater transparency to investors, thereby reducing fears and increasing investor
confidence.
I provide a detailed examination of the OTC trading environment. In particular, I first
provide a descriptive analysis of firms and trading activity within each tier. I also examine
determinants of trading in this marketplace, with special attention to determinants within each
tier, and find that firms in higher tier designations find greater liquidity. I compare trading
characteristics of the top decile of performers versus the bottom decile of performers. The
winners are more illiquid, trade less during the sample period, and are less volatile than the
portfolio of losers. Lastly, I look at day-of-the-week effects in trading and find that, similar to
listed markets, OTC trading activity is highest on Tuesdays.
Currently, little is known about OTC securities, and thus my analysis adds to the small
stream of literature examining the modernized OTC marketplace. My paper describes in detail all
three OTC tier designations and provides an overview of trading within each tier. Given the
costs and benefits of improved liquidity discussed in this paper, my results are of interest to both
traders

and

managers
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alike.
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Table 1: Tiers Summary This table provides a short summary of the three OTC marketplace
tiers: OTCQX, OTCQB, and OTC Pink. Firms on OTCQX meet the highest standards. OTCQB
firms are current in their reporting, but do not qualify for OTCQX. OTC Pink firms are either
unable or willing to provide adequate levels of information and transparency. Securities not
quoted on the OTC Link ATS or on the OTCBB and are designated to the Grey Market. The
information below was retrieved from otcmarkets.com.
OTCQX- "The Best Marketplace"
For established, investor-focused companies
Meet Highest Financial Standards required by OTC Markets Group
Are Current in Their Disclosures
Receive third party advisory
Minimum bid price of at least $0.10
Pay application ($5000) and ongoing annual fees ($15,000)
Further classified as OTCQX U.S, OTCQX International, OTCQX Banks
International Firms (already listed on international exchange) may qualify for tier by making home disclosures in English
SEC Rule 12g3-2b allows registration exemptions for some foreign securities

OTCQB- "The Venture Marketplace"
For entrepreneurial & development stage firms
Current in reporting to U.S. or foreign regulator
No Minimum Financial Standards
Minimum bid price of at least $0.01
Must undergo an annual verification and management certification process
Pay application ($2,500) and ongoing annual fees ($10,000)

OTC Pink- "The Open Marketplace"
Marketplace for a wide variety of companies that are there by reasons of default, distress, or design
No Disclosure Requirements or Financial Qualifications
No Application or Annual Fees
Bankrupt firms, Shell companies, and development stage companies
Further classified as Pink Current Information, Pink Limited Information, or Pink No Information

Grey Market
Securities that are not traded on the OTCQX, OTCQB, or OTC Pink
No Market Makers/Broker-dealers are not willing or able to publicly quote these securities
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Table 2: Sample Description This table classifies the sample of securities by tier designation, security type, and price. Because many securities change tier
designations during the sample period, in Panels A and B, I present a snapshot of firm/security classifications on the first and last date of the sample period,
February 18, 2014, and March 6, 2015, respectively. Ordinary Shares are common stock of foreign companies. American Depository Receipts (ADRs) are
issued by a U.S. depository bank and provide investors the opportunity to own and trade international securities in U.S. dollars during normal U.S. trading hours.
Panel C presents the number of securities throughout the complete sample according to price partition. Panel D categorizes OTC securities in different price
partitions by tier designation. A firm that changes tiers during the sample period appear in all applicable partitions. Firms on OTCQX meet the highest standards.
OTCQB firms are current in their reporting, but do not qualify for OTCQX. OTC Pink firms are either unable or willing to provide adequate levels of
information and transparency. Securities not quoted on OTC Link ATS or on OTCBB and are designated to the Grey Market.
Panel A: February 18, 2014 Snapshot
OTCQX

OTCQB

OTC Pink

Grey

Total

ADRs

112

8

1,061

46

1,227

Common Stock

33

2,325

2,618

325

5,301

Ordinary Shares

171

175

1,259

1,936

3,541

Total

316

2,508

4,938

2,307

10,069

OTCQX

OTCQB

OTC Pink

Grey

Total

111

5

1,073

24

1,213

Common Stock

95

1,509

2,932

622

5,158

Ordinary Shares

146

138

1,515

1,580

3,379

Total

352

1,652

5,520

2,226

9,750

[$0.01-$0.10)

[$0.10-$1.00)

[$1.00-$5.00)

> $5.00

ADRs
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Panel B: March 6, 2015 Snapshot

Panel C: Full Sample Period by Average Price
($0, $0.01)

Total

# Securities

2,005

1,915

2,243

1,333

2,972

10,468

% of Total

19.15%

18.29%

21.43%

12.73%

28.39%

100.00%

($0, $0.01)

[$0.01-$0.10)

[$0.10-$1.00)

[$1.00-$5.00)

> $5.00

OTCQX

0.04%

2.48%

5.87%

4.19%

5.00%

OTCQB

10.48%

22.57%

32.60%

28.45%

18.44%

OTC Pink

66.71%

55.83%

42.62%

44.52%

52.29%

Grey

22.78%

19.12%

18.91%

22.84%

24.26%

Total

100.00%

100.00%

100.00%

100.00%

100.00%

Panel D: Securities by Price and Tier
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Table 3: Summary Statistics This table provides summary statistics according to tier. Price is share price. Range % is daily high price minus
daily low price divided by closing price. Relative Spread is the difference in the closing bid-ask spread divided by the closing midpoint. Turnover
is daily volume divided by shares outstanding. # Trades/day is the number of trades in each security by day. PNT is the percentage of days a
security does not trade. Volume is total shares traded per day. $ Volume is dollar volume per day. Market Cap is price multiplied by shares
outstanding and is reported in millions. #Shareholders are the number of shareholders on record. Each variable is found at the security level first
and then averaged.

Price
PNT
Spread %
# trades/day
Trade Size
Volume
$ Volume
Range %
Mkt Cap
# Mkt Makers
# Shareholders
Panel B: OTCQB
Price
PNT
Spread %
# trades/day
Trade Size
Volume
$ Volume
Range %
Mkt Cap
# Mkt Makers
# Shareholders

Mean
9.9957
35.73
12.09
31.25
3,570
45,800
361,435
3.75
6,142,768,635
10.66
18,240

p5
0.0471
0
0.32
1.55
168
416
611
0.25
2,564,224
4.51
61

p25
0.2072
1.5
1.98
2.51
455
3,094
3,227
1.08
12,895,178
6.35
139

Med
1.038
28.68
5.83
5.02
1,403
17,782
12,837
2.52
44,290,797
9.53
398

p75
10.7951
66.67
16.33
18.19
4,701
45,096
52,138
5.42
598,852,712
13.9
1,000

p95
36.7267
91.7
42.3
149.12
13,316
179,514
1,762,187
10.85
28,262,715,390
20.57
2,500

Sigma
32.3289
33.44
17.04
95.7
5,346
95,984
2,362,840
3.76
33,674,208,275
5.03
167,978

N
451
451
451
451
451
451
451
451
451
451
93

Mean
25.8878
40.3
24.96
25.93
36,876
2,809,787
99,415
9.31
1,568,561,734
11.02
25,783

p5
0.0045
0
1.55
1.47
164
378
374
0.29
302,687
5
22

p25
0.0713
5.28
5.48
2.55
656
2,418
2,565
1.84
2,732,140
8.13
77

Med
0.4339
37.5
13.99
4.55
2,484
15,330
8,521
7.58
10,909,731
10.6
194

p75
3.5546
70.94
31.89
12.85
8,493
92,087
25,801
13.39
31,962,910
13.41
529

p95
30.3011
93.58
88.81
82.4
81,907
3,206,363
192,004
25.81
295,274,000
18.35
2,000

Sigma
475.003
33.3
30.85
162.02
226,253
21,240,129
1,154,578
9.24
12,536,812,804
4.19
907,191

N
2721
2739
2726
2721
2721
2721
2721
2715
2739
2739
1936
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Panel A: OTCQX

Panel C: OTC Pink

Price
PNT
# trades/day
Trade Size
Volume
$ Volume
Range %
Mkt Cap
# Shareholders

Mean
18.2861
51.31
34.82
15.55
91,475
2,235,815
100,740
8.02
10,056,788,982
8.78
32,726

p5
0.0005
0
0.52
1.2
132
300
51
0
42,866
4
22

p25
0.0079
17.36
3.24
1.77
691
2,924
532
0.66
567,607
6
77

Med
0.1588
57.74
21.73
2.85
4,157
16,884
3,744
3.83
7,421,522
8
186

p75
6.1568
83.4
50.88
7.61
16,977
89,615
23,672
12.35
1,262,414,430
10.7
451

p95
42.7934
95.47
122122
59.53
554,332
9,233,366
325,794
27.83
34,307,145,000
17.08
2,000

Sigma
218.1052
34.21
40.53
59.81
338,191
12,462,481
821,998
10.31
90,730,227,669
3.95
1,176,044

N
6504
6559
6522
6491
6491
6491
6491
6476
6559
6555
2926

Mean
21.96
82.78
2.51
45,481
119,675
46,368
2.75
3,067,484,223
118,162

p5
0.0001
32.08
1
158
215
1.49
0
10,092
16

p25
0.0313
78.49
1.15
1061
1,656
508
0
838,697
72

Med
0.5528
90.94
1.44
4,047
7,282
5,282
0.19
45,554,450
223.5

p75
9.23
95.47
2.17
13,015
26,859
22,179
1.66
1,542,637,071
560.5

p95
64.79
100
5.63
142,087
269,328
130,546
17.13
13,246,740,150
2,800

Sigma
186.43
20.74
7.39
258,107
806,976
302,724
7.22
14,902,173,920
2,419,250

N
2494
2690
2496
2496
2496
2487
2446
2690
424
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Price
PNT
Spread %
# trades/day
Trade Size
Volume
$ Volume
Range %
Mkt Cap
# Mkt Makers
# Shareholders
Panel D: Grey
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Table 4: Tier Changes This table presents the number of tier changes according to type. Firms on
OTCQX meet the highest standards. OTCQB firms are current in their reporting, but do not qualify for
OTCQX. OTC Pink firms are either unable or willing to provide adequate levels of information and
transparency. Securities not quoted on the OTC Link ATS or on the OTCBB and are designated to the
Grey Market.

Panel A: Tier Changes
Tier Rise

Tier Drop

TOTAL
OTCQB to OTCQX
Pink to OTCQX
Grey to OTCQX
Pink to OTCQB
Grey to OTCQB
Grey to Pink
Total
OTCQX to OTCQB
OTCQX to Pink
OTCQX to Grey
OTCQB to Pink
OTCQB to Grey
Pink to Grey
Total

# Tier Changes
2622
71
46
1
514
10
361
1003
15
49
2
1209
21
323
1619

Panel B: Serial Changers
# Tier Changes
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
# Unique Securities
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# Securities
1488
240
121
42
13
4
4
2
1914

# Firms
2347
71
46
1
432
10
357
917
15
48
2
1022
21
322
1430

APPENDIX 5: LIQUIDITY DETERMINANTS
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Table 5: Liquidity Determinants. Panels A and B (Panels C and D) report determinants of PNT (#Trades). PNT is the percentage of days
with no trading. #Trades is the average daily number of trades. The results reported below represent aggregated variables for each firm over the
entire sample period using a Tobit analysis in Panel A and Panel C and ordinary least squares (OLS) in Panel B and Panel B. Range % is the
average of the daily high price minus low price divided by the closing price. # Mkt Makers is the average of the number of market makers that
quote a security throughout the day. Mkt Cap is the log of share price multiplied by shares outstanding. SEC is an indicator variable equal to
one if the firm is registered with the SEC, zero otherwise. ADR is an indicator variable equal to one if the security is an ADR, zero otherwise.
OTCQB is a dummy variable equal to one if the security is designated to the OTCQB tier, zero otherwise. OTCQX is a dummy variable equal
to one if the security is designated to the OTCQX Tier, zero otherwise. All variables are trimmed at the 1% and 99% levels. Robust t-statistics
are reported in parentheses.

Panel A: Tobit
Price

All
0.0364

All
0.0174

Pink
-0.0996***

OTCQB
0.2983***

OTCQX
0.7689***

Range %

(1.528)
-1.1653***

(0.744)
-1.1442***

(-3.645)
-0.8937***

(4.916)
-1.6200***

(3.851)
-2.1430***

# Mkt Makers

(-21.356)
-6.2154***

(-20.821)
-6.4377***

(-15.505)
-7.1482***

(-13.924)
-5.5639***

(-3.666)
-5.8206***

Mkt Cap (log)

(-69.980)
-1.6378***

(-70.043)
-1.6397***

(-61.420)
-1.0032***

(-34.584)
-1.9606***

(-14.887)
-9.8400***

SEC

(-12.551)
-0.6274

(-12.706)
-4.1565***

(-6.960)
0.3398

(-5.718)
-7.5300***

(-9.255)
8.7469**

ADR

(-0.901)
12.2387***

(-5.315)
14.7702***

(0.340)
17.9819***

(-5.406)
-17.0776

(2.233)
51.6212***

(10.633)

(12.607)
7.6829***

(14.128)

(-1.560)

(10.167)

OTCQB
OTCQX

(9.378)
-10.5189***

Constant
Observations

136.1992***

(-7.289)
137.5638***

129.9881***

146.4454***

259.1042***

(58.460)
7,009

(59.405)
7,009

(50.145)
4,491

(25.983)
2,141

(15.065)
377

*** Statistically significant at the 0.01 level; ** Statistically significant at the 0.05 level; * Statistically significant at the 0.10 level
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𝑃𝑁𝑇𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 #𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑀𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽4 log(𝑀𝑘𝑡𝐶𝑎𝑝)𝑖 + 𝛽5 𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑖 + 𝛽6 𝐴𝐷𝑅𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝑂𝑇𝐶𝑄𝐵𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝑂𝑇𝐶𝑄𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖

All
0.0241

All
0.0071

Pink
-0.0949***

OTCQB
0.3041***

OTCQX
0.5876***

Range %

(1.083)
-1.0089***

(0.326)
-0.9953***

(-3.834)
-0.8346***

(5.218)
-1.1922***

(3.354)
-1.9324***

# Mkt Makers

(-22.054)
-5.2161***

(-21.608)
-5.4055***

(-15.988)
-6.0094***

(-13.955)
-4.6462***

(-3.613)
-4.7045***

Mkt Cap (log)

(-72.773)
-1.3981***

(-72.622)
-1.3963***

(-62.782)
-0.8711***

(-35.256)
-1.6035***

(-14.374)
-8.4143***

SEC

(-11.494)
-1.3253**

(-11.589)
-4.3692***

(-6.424)
0.0845

(-5.241)
-8.4413***

(-8.623)
5.6539

ADR

(-2.088)
12.9779***

(-6.278)
15.2280***

(0.093)
18.0411***

(-7.075)
-8.5210

(1.639)
47.6558***

(12.530)

(14.375)
6.6710***

(15.434)

(-1.190)

(10.045)

OTCQB
OTCQX

(9.263)
-9.4637***

Constant
Observations
R-squared
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Panel B: OLS
Price

123.4315***

(-7.397)
124.5674***

118.8163***

129.4762***

227.0574***

(57.600)
7,009
0.4803

(58.401)
7,009
0.4923

(48.856)
4,491
0.5009

(25.699)
2,141
0.4997

(14.430)
377
0.5766

*** Statistically significant at the 0.01 level; ** Statistically significant at the 0.05 level; * Statistically significant at the 0.10 level

#𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 #𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑀𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽4 log(𝑀𝑘𝑡𝐶𝑎𝑝)𝑖 + 𝛽5 𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑖 + 𝛽6 𝐴𝐷𝑅𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝑂𝑇𝐶𝑄𝐵𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝑂𝑇𝐶𝑄𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖
All
-0.0372***

All
-0.0308**

Pink
0.0124

OTCQB
-0.0971***

OTCQX
-0.3988***

Range %

(-2.839)
0.7019***

(-2.356)
0.7034***

(0.819)
0.5040***

(-3.546)
1.1748***

(-2.731)
0.9281***

# Mkt Makers

(20.400)
2.7364***

(20.022)
2.7770***

(14.407)
2.9625***

(15.515)
2.6221***

(3.513)
2.5814***

Mkt Cap (log)

(34.067)
0.7810***

(33.218)
0.7834***

(26.591)
0.3422***

(19.043)
1.4778***

(7.774)
5.4187***

SEC

(11.378)
-4.1453***

(11.407)
-3.3612***

(4.679)
-5.1525***

(7.303)
-2.0071**

(6.145)
-11.3086***

ADR

(-9.175)
1.2658*

(-6.713)
0.7169

(-8.295)
-0.3682

(-2.194)
10.0440

(-3.788)
-19.1021***

(1.764)

(0.998)
-1.4748***

(-0.517)

(1.435)

(-4.464)

OTCQB
OTCQX

(-2.834)
4.1690***

Constant
Observations
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Panel C: Tobit
Price

-32.9520***

(4.128)
-33.4426***

-25.3927***

-49.7295***

(-23.192)
7,009

(-23.345)
7,009

(-16.682)
4,491

(-13.429)
2,141

-104.4683***
(-7.101)
377

*** Statistically significant at the 0.01 level; ** Statistically significant at the 0.05 level; * Statistically significant at the 0.10 level

#𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 #𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑀𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽4 log(𝑀𝑘𝑡𝐶𝑎𝑝)𝑖 + 𝛽5 𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑖 + 𝛽6 𝐴𝐷𝑅𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝑂𝑇𝐶𝑄𝐵𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝑂𝑇𝐶𝑄𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖
All
-0.0406***

All
-0.0341**

Pink
0.0110

OTCQB
-0.0945***

OTCQX
-0.3944**

Range %

(-2.605)
0.7567***

(-2.189)
0.7583***

(0.608)
0.5135***

(-2.936)
1.3438***

(-2.298)
0.9549***

# Mkt Makers

(18.351)
3.0737***

(17.847)
3.1151***

(13.221)
3.3534***

(12.807)
2.9184***

(3.414)
2.8191***

Mkt Cap (log)

(28.832)
0.8542***

(27.991)
0.8566***

(21.994)
0.3682***

(16.202)
1.6079***

(7.157)
5.5554***

SEC

(10.607)
-4.7247***

(10.636)
-3.9273***

(4.408)
-5.8297***

(6.571)
-2.6543**

(5.500)
-12.0567***

ADR

(-8.475)
1.3624

(-6.305)
0.8030

(-7.944)
-0.7420

(-2.232)
8.7764

(-3.624)
-18.3091***

(1.563)

(0.919)
-1.5037**

(-0.841)

(1.293)

(-3.819)

OTCQB
OTCQX

(-2.255)
4.2198***

Constant
Observations
R-squared
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Panel D: OLS
Price

37.1514***

(3.609)
37.6486***

28.7606***

55.4929***

108.8863***

(-20.959)
7,009
0.3177

(-21.120)
7,009
0.3200

(-15.179)
4,491
0.3321

(-11.919)
2,141
0.3543

(-6.437)
377
0.3633

*** Statistically significant at the 0.01 level; ** Statistically significant at the 0.05 level; * Statistically significant at the 0.10 level
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Table 6: Determinants of Spreads. This table presents results for regressions of Relative Spread (closing ask minus closing bid divided by midpoint) as the
dependent variable on a host of independent variables. Panel A presents the results from the Tobit model. Panel B presents results from OLS. Price is the
average closing price. # Trades is the average number of trades per day. Range is the average of the daily high price minus low price divided by the closing
price. # Mkt Makers is the average of the number of market makers that quote a security throughout the day. Mkt Cap is the log of share price multiplied by
shares outstanding. SEC is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm is registered with the SEC, zero otherwise. ADR is an indicator variable equal to one if
the security is an ADR, zero otherwise. Pink is a dummy variable equal to one if the security is designated to the OTC Pink Tier, zero otherwise. OTCQX is a
dummy variable equal to one if the security is designated to the OTCQX Tier, zero otherwise. All variables are trimmed at the 1% and 99% levels. Robust tstatistics are reported in parentheses.

Panel A: Tobit
Price
# Trades
Range
# Mkt Makers
Mkt Cap (log)
SEC
ADR

All
0.0065
(0.453)
-0.1006***
(-9.201)
0.5749***
(16.108)
-2.1066***
(-30.995)
-3.0394***
(-30.170)
1.7197***
(3.249)
11.0059***
(17.379)

Pink
OTCQX
Constant
Observations

88.5308***
(40.902)
6,959

All
0.0027
(0.191)
-0.0994***
(-9.248)
0.5450***
(14.999)
-2.0117***
(-28.177)
-3.0548***
(-30.448)
2.6715***
(4.765)
10.1476***
(15.566)
3.2383***
(5.889)
-2.0387***
(-2.586)
85.9290***
(39.764)
6,959

Pink
0.0259*
(1.724)
-0.1104***
(-7.263)
0.5107***
(11.699)
-1.7343***
(-18.286)
-3.5137***
(-29.808)
-0.6131
(-0.721)
9.5394***
(13.261)

OTCQB
-0.0829**
(-1.971)
-0.1106***
(-6.729)
0.6347***
(9.560)
-2.4998***
(-19.805)
-1.3211***
(-5.771)
4.5761***
(5.832)
9.8115
(1.397)

OTCQX
0.0855
(1.160)
0.0046
(0.241)
0.7764***
(4.057)
-1.2930***
(-7.483)
-4.4528***
(-6.138)
-0.5131
(-0.326)
21.6430***
(7.257)

95.7993***
(37.379)
4,447

61.6958***
(14.423)
2,137

96.7822***
(7.671)
375

*** Statistically significant at the 0.01 level; ** Statistically significant at the 0.05 level; * Statistically significant at the 0.10 level
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%𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽2 #𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽4 #𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑀𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽5 log(𝑀𝑘𝑡𝐶𝑎𝑝)𝑖 + 𝛽6 𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐴𝐷𝑅𝑖 + 𝛽8 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑘𝑖 + 𝛽9 𝑂𝑇𝐶𝑄𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖

# Trades
Range
# Mkt Makers
Mkt Cap (log)
SEC
ADR

All
0.0103
(0.676)
-0.1018***
(-8.517)
0.5915***
(13.290)
-2.2423***
(-28.762)
-3.1508***
(-25.996)
1.7618***
(2.937)
11.6933***
(16.397)

Pink
OTCQX
Constant
Observations

92.0030***
(35.050)
6,959
0.4465

All
0.0061
(0.400)
-0.1004***
(-8.525)
0.5602***
(12.322)
-2.1445***
(-26.493)
-3.1668***
(-26.188)
2.7315***
(4.259)
10.8124***
(14.819)
3.3492***
(5.470)
-2.3728***
(-2.862)
89.3406***
(34.442)
6,959
0.4508

Pink
0.0295*
(1.839)
-0.1107***
(-6.685)
0.5265***
(9.584)
-1.9026***
(-17.367)
-3.6403***
(-25.414)
-0.5214
(-0.531)
10.4048***
(12.631)

OTCQB
-0.0834*
(-1.907)
-0.1127***
(-6.139)
0.6549***
(7.983)
-2.6053***
(-18.310)
-1.3375***
(-5.176)
4.5507***
(5.179)
9.8814
(1.418)

OTCQX
0.0849
(1.145)
0.0045
(0.232)
0.7756***
(4.022)
-1.2926***
(-7.429)
-4.4442***
(-6.110)
-0.5047
(-0.318)
21.6123***
(7.227)

99.8339***
(31.819)
4,447
0.4762

63.2981***
(12.918)
2,137
0.3837

96.6330***
(7.641)
375
0.4856

*** Statistically significant at the 0.01 level; ** Statistically significant at the 0.05 level; * Statistically significant at the 0.10 level
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Panel B:
OLS
Price

APPENDIX 7: RETURN PERFORMANCE
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Table 7: Return Performance. This table considers the trading determinants of the top decile of
performers versus the bottom decile of performers over the sample period. Due to data limitations, I only
calculate returns for firms reporting shares outstanding on February 14, 2014, and March 6, 2015, where
shares outstanding on these dates are within ten percent of each other. I also require a firm to trade in
either February or March of 2014 and also trade in February or March of 2015, in order to calculate the
buy-and-hold return. Dividends are not considered in returns. I trim observations at the 1% and 99%
levels. # Trades is total number of trades during the sample period. Range % is price range divided by
the average of the daily high and low prices. PNT is the percentage of days during the sample period a
firm does not trade. # Market Makers is the number of broker-dealers quoting each security. % Spread is
the closing bid-ask spread divided by the quote midpoint. Lastly, Mkt Cap is the log of a firms market
cap (price multiplied by shares outstanding).

Panel A:

Winners

Losers

# Firms

510

509

OTCQX

2%

3%

OTCQB

23%

29%

OTC Pink

75%

68%

100%

100%

>$5

12%

4%

$1-$5

7%

11%

<$1.00

80%

85%

100%

100%

Panel B

Winners

Losers

Diff

t-stat

# Trades

1,186

3,193

-2,007***

-2.93

Range %

8.3

11.26

-2.96***

-6.20

PNT

61.15

47.09

14.06***

7.60

Mkt Makers

7.93

9.27

-1.33***

-6.40

% Spread

49.54

45.92

3.62

1.35

Mkt Cap

14.70

15.02

-0.32

-1.58
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APPENDIX 8: OTC STOCKS BY PRICE
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Figure 1a OTC Stocks by Price categorizes the full sample of OTC stocks according to price.
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Figure 1b OTC Stocks by Price and Tier categorizes OTC stock prices by tier designation.
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APPENDIX 9: TRADING BY DAY-OF-THE-WEEK
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Figure 2: Trading by Day-of-the-Week This figure presents the percentage of all trades that occur on each weekday. Results for
volume are quantitatively similar.

Monday

Tuesday

Wednesday Thursday

Friday

PART 2: AN ANALYSIS OF PENNY STOCKS AND LISTED SECURITIES TRADING
UNDER FIVE DOLLARS
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PART 2

INTRODUCTION
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) defines a “penny stock” as a security
trading under five dollars that is not listed on a national exchange. 19 Penny stocks provide
investors the potential for unlimited upside at a small dollar investment.

The downside,

however, is that they are inherently risky and difficult to price because they trade infrequently,
have variable reporting standards, and provide little information to investors. The SEC considers
penny stocks speculative investments. Penny stocks are notorious for information asymmetry
and due to their extreme prices, volatility, and illiquidity levels, are susceptible to deception,
manipulation, fraud, and most recently to “pump and dump” spam campaigns (see, for example,
Bollen

and

Christie,

2009,

and

Hu,

19

McInish,

and

Zeng,

2010).

Academic studies of OTC securities do not apply consistent identification criteria for penny stocks. Some define
penny stocks as listed securities trading under five dollars, while other studies use a one dollar threshold. These
distinctions are nontrivial. A penny stock, as defined by the SEC, refers to any security trading under five dollars
that is not listed on the national exchange. It is these penny stock securities, as defined by the SEC, that are
specifically subject to penny stock rules. The SEC defines a penny stock as “any equity security other than a
security that: (a) is an NMS stock listed on a “grandfathered” national securities exchange, (b) is an NMS stock
listed on a national securities exchange or an automated quotation system sponsored by a registered national
securities association that satisfies certain minimum quantitative listing standards, (c) has a transaction price of five
dollars or more, (d) is issued by a registered investment company or by the Options Clearing Corporation, (e) is a
listed security futures product, or (f) is a security whose issuer has met certain net tangible assets or average
revenues.” See SEC Rule 3a51-1 for exemptions.
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Penny stocks are typically shares of small companies that trade over-the-counter (OTC)
and quote on OTC Link ATS and/or the OTC Bulletin Board (OTCBB). While only companies
that file current financial reports with the SEC or bank/insurance regulator quote on the OTCBB,
no such restriction exists on OTC Link ATS. As a result, most penny stocks quote exclusively on
OTC Link ATS and are designated to the OTC Pink marketplace within the new tiered system of
marketplaces established by OTC Markets Group in 2007.20 As of 2015, approximately 10,000
global securities with aggregate market caps of $14.6 trillion trade over $201 billion annually in
the tiered marketplaces operated by OTC Markets Group.

While these metrics pale in

comparison to listed markets, OTC securities are important especially considering they are
primarily held by retail investors (Eraker and Ready, 2015). A large portion of OTC securities
are penny stocks. As seen in Figure 1, almost 80% of OTC securities in my sample have an
average closing price below five dollars. Over 80% of these have an average price below one
dollar.
Recent studies give attention to stocks with lottery-like features (i.e. stocks with high
return volatility and negative average returns). Kumar (2009), for example, identifies low-priced
stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility and high idiosyncratic skewness as lotteries, and
20

OTC securities are currently organized into one of three tiered marketplaces (OTCQX, OTCQB, and OTC Pink)
depending on the quality and quantity of information firms make available. Firms on OTCQX meet the highest
standards and are current in their disclosures. OTCQB is designed for entrepreneurial and development stage
companies that are current in their reporting, but do not meet all of the conditions for the OTCQX designation. In
2013, the SEC recognized OTCQX and OTCQB as “established public markets.” Either by “default, distress, or
design,” any security not designated to OTCQX or OTCQB trades in the OTC Pink marketplace. OTC Pink firms
are either unable or unwilling to provide adequate levels of information and transparency. Based on the variety of
firms within this tier, OTC Markets Group further categorizes these firms into Pink Current Information, Pink
Limited Information, and Pink No Information based on the level of disclosure. Pink Current Information firms
follow one of the allowed reporting standards and make their filings publically available through the OTC
Disclosure & News Service. Pink Limited Information firms include companies under financial distress or in
bankruptcy, or firms with financial reporting problems. These companies provide financial information via OTC
Disclosure and News Service or make a filing on EDGAR within the most recent six month period. Lastly, as the
designation suggests, Pink No Information firms are either unable or unwilling to provide information, or if
information is filed, it is older than six months. This category includes defunct companies, along with dark
companies that have questionable management and disclosure practices. Lastly, securities that do not quote are
designated to the Grey Market.
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suggests that individual investors have preferences for stocks with lottery-like characteristics.
Lottery stocks are “cheap bets” and tend to be firms that are younger and smaller, exhibit less
institutional ownership, and are less likely to pay a dividend (Kumar; and Eraker and Ready,
2015).21 OTC stocks are primarily held by retail traders, are extremely illiquid and difficult to
short, have few financial reporting requirements, and exhibit highly skewed returns.
Consequently, OTC firms are stocks with lottery-like payoffs that tend to attract gamblers
(Nofsinger and Varma, 2014; Ang, Shtauber, and Tetlock, 2013; Eraker and Ready; and
Bruggemann, Kaul, Leuz, and Werner, 2013). Eraker and Ready find that OTC stocks are more
illiquid and have lower returns than CRSP securities, and as a result, find it puzzling that
investors are willing hold a portfolio of OTC securities when they have access to the CRSP
universe of securities. Explaining their results through the model of Barberis and Huang (2008),
Eraker and Ready argue that investors might have preferences for stocks with lottery features and
are thus willing to accept negative returns for assets with lottery features.
Not all OTC stocks possess lottery-like characteristics. Nofsinger and Varma identify
OTC stocks with lottery features as penny stocks priced under one dollar. While gambling
preferences do not explain demand for all OTC stocks, Nofsinger and Varma find that
preferences for stocks with lottery features explain demand for OTC securities priced under one
dollar. Most importantly, because OTC securities are assets with lottery-like payoffs (Eraker and
Ready, 2015, and Bruggemann, Kaul, Leuz, and Werner, 2013), and investors in penny stocks
priced under one dollar have gambling preferences (Nofsinger and Varma, 2014), then penny
stocks trading under one dollar may generate significantly more investor interest than those
priced over one dollar. Consequently, the lottery-like characteristics of OTC penny stocks may
21

While price is an obvious lottery stock identifier, Kumar concedes that individual investors are unlikely to
calculate idiosyncratic volatility or idiosyncratic skewness to identify lottery stocks, but states that even less
sophisticated investors will be able to distinguish between stocks with differing levels of these metrics.
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be beneficial to the market quality of these securities relative to penny stocks above the dollar
threshold. OTC penny stocks may display more favorable market metrics relative to low-priced,
listed securities as well, especially since there are no mandated tick size rules for OTC securities.
While small pricing increments could be detrimental to market quality (Bollen and Christie,
2009), Macey, O’Hara, and Pompilio (2008) find that dollar spreads decrease for some large,
low-priced, actively traded (delisted) NYSE firms moving to the Pink Sheets as a result of the
differences in pricing schemes between these two markets.
The above research question is part of my overall analysis of penny stock liquidity
presented in this paper. I also compare liquidity metrics of OTC securities priced under five
dollars to the liquidity of two reference groups. The first group consists of almost 2,000 nonpenny OTC securities (i.e. OTC securities trading at a price above $5.00). Within this group, I
analyze penny stock liquidity across price partitions and OTC marketplace tiers. In an analysis
of firms moving from a listed exchange to the OTC market, Macey, O’Hara, and Pompilio
(2008) state that trading in different venues has diverse consequences for stock prices.
According to Nofsinger and Varma (2014), not only are penny stocks different than listed
securities, they have different characteristics and trading behavior from other non-penny OTC
stocks as well. The tier designation and listing status of the securities in this study provide a
unique setting to examine the effects of information disclosure on prices and market quality.
Information disclosure allows shareholders (and creditors) to evaluate potential returns and
monitor the use of capital (Beyer, Cohen, Lys, and Walther, 2010).

Greater transparency

improves market quality and reduces information asymmetry (Welker, 1995; Leuz and
Verrecchia, 2000; and Bushee and Leuz, 2005). Because disclosure of information resolves
uncertainty and reduces divergence of opinion, penny stocks in higher information tiers (or
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listing status) should have higher valuations, trade more frequently, have less volatility and lower
trading costs than penny stocks in lower information tiers. The second comparison group is a
sample of 674 low-priced, listed securities. 63 of these securities are priced between $0.10 and
$1.00, while the remaining 611 securities trade between $1.00 and $5.00.
I document positive externalities resulting from the lottery-like features of penny stocks.
In particular, I find that OTC penny stocks are more liquid than their non-penny counterparts.
However, on average, increased investor interest does not lead to an improvement in market
quality for these securities relative to non-penny OTC securities. I also find that penny stocks
designated to higher information tiers are more liquid than OTC securities designated to lower
information tiers. OTC securities, as a whole, are still extremely illiquid. I find that listed
securities are more liquid than comparable OTC securities. However, results for daily price
volatility of listed securities relative to OTC securities are mixed.

64

LITERATURE REVIEW
Few studies consider penny stock liquidity. I review some of the relevant literature on
OTC securities (and listed securities) trading under $5.00 per share. Since this paper focuses on
penny stock liquidity, I also provide a summary of related studies of OTC lottery features and/or
OTC stock liquidity. Bruggemann, Kaul, Luez, and Werner (2013) analyze a sample of U.S.
firms trading OTC and find that investors pay attention to the information differences across
firms and venues and transact accordingly. While their study does not focus exclusively on
penny stocks, they add price-level dummies for securities trading under a dollar and conclude
that OTC firms tend to be small penny stocks with negative average returns and high return
volatility, or assets with lottery-like payoffs. Bruggemann, Kaul, Leuz, and Werner fail to find
return differences between the OTC information regimes and explain their results through retail
investors’ preferences for lottery-like assets coupled with short-sale constraints. They argue that
such restrictions may lead sophisticated investors to withdraw from the market, which may make
it more difficult to price securities and in turn find return differences between the different
information tiers. Bruggemann, Kaul, Leuz, and Werner believe the lower market quality they
document is a result of low investor participation. Jiang, Petroni, and Wang (2013) look at the
introduction of the newly tiered OTC marketplace and find that firms designated as Pink Sheet
Current Information (No Information) experience an increase (decrease) in liquidity. Similarly,
Litvak (2009) finds that firms designated to the low disclosure tiers experience negative returns
after the announcement of the new tiered system and concludes that summaries of publicly
available

information

can

affect
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stock

prices.

Using discount brokerage house data from 1991-1995, provided by Barber and Odean,
Nofsinger and Varma (2014) find that investors in OTC securities are older, wealthier, trade
more, and tend to display greater portfolio diversification than investors that do not trade OTC
securities. Nofsinger and Varma conclude that, as a whole, these investors do not seem to
display lottery-seeking characteristics. However, they find that investors in penny stocks are, on
average, less affluent, married, Catholic, African-American or Hispanic males who live in urban
areas. These individuals have less diversified portfolios and trade more frequently than other
OTC investors.

Eraker and Ready (2015) document a negative return premium for OTC

securities and attribute it to investors’ preference for positively skewed lottery assets. Return
distributions of OTC stocks are highly positively skewed meaning that most OTC stocks perform
poorly, but some do really well.
Ang, Shatauber, and Tetlock (2013) restrict their attention to OTC securities priced over
one dollar and find that, relative to listed stocks, OTC stocks have fewer intuitional investors, are
more illiquid, and disclose less information.

While the size, value, and volatility return

premiums are similar to listed markets, the OTC market has an illiquidity (momentum) premium
that is higher (lower) than in listed markets. Bushee and Leuz (2005) find an increase in
liquidity for some OTC firms resulting from a regulatory change requiring OTCBB firms to
comply with the Exchange Act (see footnote 2).
Some studies consider stock liquidity immediately after a firm is delisted from a national
exchange and subsequently trades OTC. Macey, O’Hara, and Pompilio (2008) find that the
failure to maintain the one dollar minimum share price is the most common reason NASDAQ
firms are delisted, and the second most common reason NYSE firms are delisted. After a firm is
delisted, market quality deteriorates. Share prices and volume fall, while quoted and effective
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spreads and volatility increase (Harris, Panchapagesan, and Werner, 2008; and Macey, O’Hara,
and Pompilio). Angel, Harris, Pauchapogesan, and Werner (2004) study involuntary delistings
and find that the further down the market hierarchy a firm falls during the delisting process, the
greater the decline in its liquidity.

Overall, results from the previous studies mentioned

immediately above find a reduction in liquidity and an increase in volatility around the delisting.
Delisted firms typically have severe corporate issues (e.g., bankruptcy) that usually accompany
negative events, negative returns, or poor future opportunities (Shumway, 1997; Shumway and
Warther, 1999; Marosi and Massoud, 2007; and Leuz, Triantis, Wang, 2008). While firms with
financial issues and reporting deficiencies trade in the OTC marketplace, they may differ from
low-priced firms that remain on a listed exchange.
Analysts do not typically follow OTC stocks. Additionally, OTC stocks rarely receive
media attention (Nofsinger and Varma, 2014). The attention they receive is usually negative in
nature, typically related to fraudulent activity, a spam campaign, or a “pump and dump” scheme.
Freider and Zittrain (2007) find that stock spam impacts prices and that trading volume is
directly related to spam e-mails.22 Stocks earn positive returns on days prior to spam e-mails, but
negative returns in the days after. Hanke and Hauser (2008) and Hu, McInish, and Zeng (2009)
also find that stock spam campaigns impact prices and trading volume. Hu, McInish, and Zeng
(2010) look at the content of spam emails and find that emails containing a short-term price
target generate abnormal returns and trading volume. Bollen and Christie (2009) look at periods
of extreme volume and volatility possibly induced by information shocks or “pump and dump”
schemes. While they find average cumulative returns are over 20%, they do not find evidence of

22

Freider and Zittrain describe the spam process: “Stock-touting spam asks a user to invest in a specific stock, and
often concedes in its fine print that the spammer has a financial interest in touting those stocks. When [the investor]
in a stock in which the spammer (or the spammer’s client) holds a stake, spam recipients can maintain or drive up
the price during the spammer’s selling so that the stock can be liquidated at a profit.”
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a continuation or reversal and suggest that periods of extreme volume are a consequence of
changes in fundamentals, as opposed to manipulation.
As a result of fraudulent activities related to penny stocks in the 1980s, the Penny Stock
Reform Act of 1990 (PSRA) gave the SEC greater regulatory power over penny stock issuers,
brokers, and dealers and required broker-dealers to provide information on penny stocks to
customers. These rules are designed for both brokers and customers to prevent deception and
manipulative practices in these securities.23 Beatty and Kadiyala (2003) study the impact of the
Penny Stock Reform Act on the initial public offering (IPO) market and find that it reduces the
number of IPOs, but does not have an effect on issuer quality.
Bradley, Cooney, Dolvin, and Jordan (2006) find that penny stock IPOs initially perform
better than other IPOs, but do not perform as well as these other IPOs over the long-run.
Additionally, they identify IPOs where the lead underwriter is subject to SEC enforcement
actions related to market manipulation and find that these IPOs have significantly higher
underpricing. Lastly, they find that gross spreads for penny stock IPOs are greater than other
IPOs. Liu, Rhee, and Zhang (2015) consider listed penny stocks trading on the NYSE, Amex,
and NASDAQ and find that these stocks are extremely illiquid, exhibit high idiosyncratic
volatility, have high transaction costs, and display similar percentages of short interest compared
to non-penny NYSE- and NASDAQ-listed securities. They also note that, contrary to popular
belief, listed stocks priced five dollars and under show large percentages of institutional investors
For example, the SEC requires broker-dealers to comply with Section 15(h) of the SEC Act of 1934 (“Exchange
Act”), which includes “enhanced suitability and disclosure obligations to customers.” In order for a broker-dealer to
transact a penny stock for a customer, it must “(1) provide the customer with a risk disclosure document, as set forth in
Schedule 15G, and receive a signed and dated acknowledgement of receipt of that document from the customer; (2)
approve the customer’s account for transactions in penny stocks, provide the customer with a suitability statement, and
receive a signed and dated copy of that statement from the customer; and (3) receive the customer’s written agreement
to the transaction. The broker dealer must also wait at least two business days after sending the customer the risk
disclosure document and the suitability statement before effecting the transaction.” Additionally, broker-dealers must
provide customers with information on the penny market along with information on the broker-dealer’s aggregate
compensation for such transactions. See Exchange Act Rules 15g for other penny stock rules.
23
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(29% of listed penny stocks are held by institutional investors). Those penny stocks with greater
institutional ownership earn significant abnormal returns, while those lightly held by institutions
do not. Luft, Levine, and Larson (2001) compare OTCBB securities to listed securities trading
from January 1, 1995, through December 31, 1998, and find that a portfolio of OTC securities is
riskier and produces lower returns than portfolios of exchange-listed securities.
Since over 65% of my sample trades under one dollar, studies of securities trading around
one dollar are also valuable to my analysis. Rhee and Wu (2015) examine NASDAQ’s one dollar
minimum bid price listing requirement and find it to be an appropriate screen to protect
investors’ interest in listed securities. Kwan, Masulis, and McInish (2015) look at the effects of
the minimum pricing increments on order flow by identifying stocks crossing the one dollar
threshold. They find that trading moves to dark trading venues when spreads are constrained by
minimum pricing increments. Studies examining tick size (minimum price increment for quotes)
and/or sub-penny prices oftentimes consider low-priced stocks near the penny-stock-price
threshold (see for example, Bessembinder, 2000; O’Hara, Saar, and Zhong, 2014; and Buti,
Consonni, Rindi, Wen, and Werner, 2014). The tick size for all U.S. stocks priced at one dollar
or more is one cent, although trades can execute for fractions of a penny. O’Hara, Saar, and
Zhong, in their study of relative tick sizes, state that the investment and trading environment for
penny stocks is extremely different from non-penny stocks.24

24

O’Hara, Saar, and Zhong (2014) use the term “penny stock” to reference listed securities priced below one dollar.
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DATA
Data in this study is provided by OTC Markets Group and covers all trading days
beginning February 18th, 2014, and ending March 6th, 2015. The data contains comprehensive
end-of-day/closing trading and quoting information. The files are similar to a daily CRSP file,
but supply information specific to OTC firms including tier designation, third-party sponsors,
and a caveat emptor flag. OTC Markets Group also provides a security data file for February
18th, 2014, and March 6th, 2015, which contain shares outstanding. I use CRSP data beginning
February 18, 2014, and ending December 31st, 2014, to compare penny stocks in the OTC
market to low priced securities in listed markets.
There are a wide variety of global securities trading in the OTC marketplace, some of
which are highly illiquid and trade infrequently during my sample period. Many academic
studies of listed securities apply standard data screens that remove low-priced stocks trading five
dollars and under from examination. These filters are justified because listing requirements of
national exchanges oftentimes exclude low-priced stocks based on a minimum bid price
threshold. As a result, the investing and trading environment for these stocks is different than
that for non-penny stocks, which makes “generalizations from penny stocks difficult” (O’Hara,
Saar, and Zhong, 2014). Recent studies of the OTC market also apply nontrivial restrictions on
their sample, thereby removing some of the important variation in this marketplace.

For

example, Eraker and Ready (2015) exclude non-US stocks, ADRs, and securities priced under
$0.01. Bruggemann, Kaul, Luez, and Werner (2013) exclude firms incorporated outside the US.
Ang, Shtauber, and Tetlock (2013) require stocks to trade over $1.00 and have a market cap of at
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least $1 million. Because my study is an analysis of penny (and low-priced) stocks, standard
filters applied in the above studies are not appropriate for the analysis. In contrast, I consider all
domestic and international securities alike, without restrictions on firm size. I require a firm to
trade at least ten times and report shares outstanding during the sample period. For comparisons
of penny stocks that trade OTC with penny stocks trading in listed markets, I restrict my
attention to common stocks and ordinary shares.25 While I do not apply rigorous filters, I
partition my sample in numerous ways to present a clear picture of the average penny stock’s
behavior and activity in the OTC market. I examine over 9,000 OTC securities and 674 listed
securities. Panel A of Table 1 categorizes the sample according to average price and listing
status. Over 20% of the OTC sample is priced below one penny, while another 20% is priced
between $0.01 and $0.10. Almost 2,200 firms trade between $0.10 and $1.00, the largest group
in the sample. Over 1,000 OTC securities trade between $1.00 and $5.00.
The purpose of this study is to analyze OTC securities trading under five dollars. In order
to do so, I compare trading of these securities to two reference groups. First, I compare penny
stocks to almost 2,000 non-penny OTC securities (i.e. OTC securities trading at a price above
$5.00). The last group consists of 674 low priced, listed securities. 63 of these securities are
priced between $0.10 and $1.00, while the remaining 611 securities trade between $1.00 and
$5.00. Panel B provides a picture of the OTC securities in the sample according to price and tier
designation. Most of the securities within each price partition trade in the OTC Pink tier,
followed by the OTCQB tier and then OTCQX. While not a tier designation, the Grey market
hosts a large portion of each price group. Penny stocks in the Grey Market do not quote, yet may
still trade. To give the reader an additional perspective on prices and tiers, I categorize each tier
according to price in Figures 2a-2d. Unlike Panel B of Table 1 that categorizes prices according
25

Ordinary shares are common stock of foreign firms.
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to tier, Figure 2 presents the makeup of each OTC tier designation and Grey Market according to
price.
Table 2 provides summary statistics for the securities in this study. The first five (last
two) columns provide descriptive statistics for the OTC (listed) securities in this study. PNT, the
primary liquidity metric within this stream of literature, represents the percentage of the number
of days during the sample period that firm does NOT trade. Thus, higher measurements of PNT
represent greater stock illiquidity. The most liquid OTC securities are those priced between
$0.10 and $1.00 (i.e. PNT metric of 52.49). For the most part, lower priced OTC securities trade
more frequently as well (as seen in # Trades and Volume), yet have higher percentage spreads
and greater price volatility (Range %) than higher priced OTC securities. On average, there is a
direct relation between the number of market makers providing quote for a stock and the price of
the security. Listed securities appear to be significantly more liquid than their OTC counterparts.
Listed securities trade almost every day of the sample period (PNT of 1.01 and 2.06,
respectively), trade more throughout the day, and have much higher dollar volume measures as
well.26 I later compare the differences between the averages of OTC securities’ liquidity metrics
relative to listed securities to determine if these differences are indeed significantly different
from zero.

26

For listed securities, the number of trades is taken from CRSP and reflect the daily number of trades on
NASDAQ. Even without including trades on other exchanges, listed securities trade significantly more than OTC
securities.
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HYPOTHESES AND RESULTS
While Eraker and Ready (2015) state that OTC stocks are lottery-like assets, Nofsinger
and Varma find that not all OTC stocks possess lottery-like characteristics. Using Kumar’s
lottery identification strategy, Nofsinger and Varma identify OTC stocks with lottery features as
penny stocks priced under one dollar.

Additionally, they find that the socioeconomic

characteristics of these investors are consistent with those of gamblers.

While gambling

preferences do not explain demand for all OTC stocks, Nofsinger and Varma find that
preferences for stocks with lottery features explain demand for OTC securities priced under one
dollar. If the average closing price of a security listed on the NYSE or NASDAQ is below one
dollar over a consecutive 30-day period, that security may be delisted by the exchange. While
the one dollar threshold is certainly consequential for listed securities, I investigate the
significance of the dollar threshold in the OTC market. Because OTC securities are assets with
lottery-like payoffs (Eraker and Ready, 2015, and Bruggemann, Kaul, Leuz, and Werner, 2013)
and investors in penny stocks have gambling preferences (Nofsinger and Varma, 2014), then
penny stocks trading under one dollar may generate significantly more investor interest than
OTC stocks priced over one dollar. Consequently, the lottery-like characteristics of OTC penny
stocks under one dollar may be beneficial to the market quality of these securities relative to lowpriced, listed securities. Results from Davis (2015) also suggest a direct relation between PNT
and Price. In other words, lower priced securities trade on more days during the sample period. I

73

thus posit that penny stocks priced under one dollar will display different trading characteristics
than penny stocks trading over one dollar.
Hypothesis 1: OTC penny stocks trading under one dollar will be more liquid than OTC
penny stocks trading over one dollar. In particular, penny stocks trading
under one dollar will trade more frequently (as seen in number of trades),
trade on more days, and have smaller closing bid-ask spreads than penny
stocks priced over one dollar.
Hypothesis 2: Volatility (daily percentage price range) of OTC penny stocks priced
under one dollar is smaller than those of OTC penny stocks priced over
one dollar.
To address Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2, I first report the results of a difference-inmeans test in Table 3, and then the results of a more detailed multivariate analysis in Table 4.
Nofsinger and Varma (2014) use the one dollar threshold to identify securities with lottery-like
characteristics.

In Table 3, I report the liquidity metrics between different granular price

partitions, paying close attention to the dollar threshold. I find that securities priced below $0.01
are more illiquid than both penny stocks priced over $0.01 and all OTC securities priced over
$0.01. Securities priced below $0.10 are also more illiquid than those above $0.10. However,
there is a noticeable liquidity shift around the dollar threshold. First, there is no significant
difference in PNT for penny stocks priced under $1.00 relative to penny stocks over $1.00.
However, penny stocks under $1.00 have lower levels of PNT (i.e. are more liquid) than all OTC
securities above the dollar threshold (including non-penny stocks). Additionally, all penny stocks
(i.e. those priced under $5.00) are more liquid than their non-penny stock counterparts (i.e. those
OTC securities priced over $5.00). When considering the number of trades per day, I find that
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firms trading in sub-pennies trade more times per day than penny stocks over $0.01 as well as all
OTC securities priced over a penny. I do not find a significant difference in # Trades for stocks
under $1.00 relative to penny stocks over $1.00. However, if all OTC securities over $1.00 are
included, those penny stocks under $1.00 are more liquid in comparison.
While penny stocks appear to trade more frequently than non-penny OTC securities, it
does not appear that higher levels of trading reduce transaction costs or volatility enough to
surpass their non-penny OTC counterparts. Both Spread % and Range % monotonically decrease
with higher prices. All penny stock classifications have higher closing spreads and daily price
volatility than those securities priced over five dollars. Thus, while some investors may prefer
lower priced OTC securities due to their lottery-like features, the increased demand does not
result in an improvement in market quality for these securities.
I next consider Hypotheses 1 and 2 in a multivariate setting. I regress PNT on price level
indicator variables, controlling for price, range, the number of market makers quoting the
security, firm size, and tier designation. I also include an SEC dummy variable equal to one if the
firm is registered with the SEC, zero otherwise. Given the extreme difficulty shorting OTC
penny stocks, the SEC dummy variable is used to proxy information disclosure. The regression
results of the cross-sectional analysis are located in Table 4 and confirm those presented in Table
3. The first four columns present the outcomes of Tobit analyses, while the last four columns
report OLS coefficients. Results for both are quantitatively similar. I run regressions on the
complete sample and then within each tier to see if any differences arise. The dependent variable
in all models is PNT.

The independent variables of interest are the price level indicator

variables. The price level dummy variable coefficients in regressions analyzing the complete
sample, the OTCQX sample, and the OTCQB sample indicate that securities priced under five
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dollars have lower levels of PNT (i.e. trade more frequently) than securities trading over five
dollars (the omitted category). However, when considering only OTC Pink firms, I find either
no significant difference in trading or higher levels of PNT for penny stocks relative to the nonpenny stock group. The larger negative coefficients on the subpenny dummy, the dime dummy,
and the dollar dummy relative to the $1.00-$5.00 dummy variable also indicate that penny stocks
below $1.00 trade more often than penny stocks over $1.00. In total, low prices and even lower
levels of transparency may appeal to some OTC investors.
Across all specifications, larger firms, firms with greater volatility, and those firms with
greater market maker participation experience greater liquidity, as seen in the negative relation
between these variables and PNT. Firms registered with the SEC are typically more liquid as
well, except for those registrants within the OTCQX tier. Strict designation standards within the
OTCQX tier may provide firms the opportunity to forego the costs associated with SEC
registration altogether. When considering the regression containing all firms along with tier
designation dummy variables, Pink and OTCQB, I find that OTC Pink and OTCQB firms have
higher levels of PNT than the OTCQX group (the omitted group). Thus, foreshadowing the next
section of my analysis, it appears that firms in the highest information tier are more liquid than
firms in lower information tiers.
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INFORMATION TIERS AND PENNY STOCK LIQUIDITY
Bruggemann, Kaul, Leuz, and Werner (2013) examine liquidity and price efficiency in
OTC firms that disclose information relative to those that do not disclose information. However,
due to the small number of firms in the tiers at the end of their sample period, Bruggemann,
Kaul, Leuz, and Werner do not consider the current OTC Marketplace tier setting. Jiang,
Petroni, and Wang (2013) look at the introduction of the newly tiered OTC marketplace and find
that firms designated as Pink Sheet Current Information (No Information) experience an increase
(decrease) in liquidity. Similarly, Litvak (2009) finds that firms designated to the low disclosure
tiers experience significant negative returns after the announcement of the new tiered system, but
before the implementation of the new classifications. Litvak concludes that “prominent
summaries of public information can affect stock prices.” Angel, Harris, Pauchapogesan, and
Werner (2004) study involuntary delistings and find that the further down the market hierarchy a
firm falls during the delisting process, the greater the decline in its liquidity. Ang, Shtauber, and
Tetlock argue that retail investors are likely to display greater levels of divergence of opinion,
which is magnified in firms that are opaque and difficult to short. As a result, price behavior and
trading characteristics for OTC securities may differ dramatically between the new information
tiers. Lastly, in an analysis of firms moving from a listed exchange to the OTC market, Macey,
O’Hara, and Pompilio (2008) state that trading in different venues has different effects on prices.
Davis (2015) shows that OTC firms in higher information tiers are more liquid than firms
in lower information tiers. Since his analysis considers all OTC securities, not just penny stocks,
he does not differentiate between penny stocks and non-penny stocks. Given the findings from
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Hypothesis 1 which indicate that penny stocks are more liquid than non-penny stocks, I next
examine whether there are differences in penny stock liquidity between the OTC information
tiers.
Hypothesis 3: The higher the information tier on which an OTC penny stock trades, the
more liquid (as seen in the percentage of days with trading activity, number of trades, and
closing bid-ask spreads) the stock is.
Table 5 presents the results for difference-in-means tests for liquidity metrics, similar to
that in Table 3. However, in this table, I compare liquidity metrics of similarly priced stocks,
segregated by tier designations, in order to determine if penny stocks in higher information tier
designations exhibit greater liquidity. Panel A presents the results for PNT. For each price
partition above $0.10, OTCQX firms trade on more days than similarly priced securities trading
in the OTCQB and OTC Pink marketplaces. OTCQB firms are also trade more often than firms
trading on OTC Pink for all price partitions. In Panel B however, in terms of daily # Trades,
OTCQX firms trade more frequently than OTCQB (OTC Pink) firms, but only for securities
priced between $1.00 and $5.00 (penny stocks priced above $0.10). For all price partitions,
OTCQB firms trade more often than OTC Pink firms. Lastly, the results for differences in
Spread % are found in Panel C. For almost all categories, firms in higher information tiers have
lower spreads than similar priced firms in lower information tiers. The two exceptions to this are
the OTCQX-OTCQB and the OTCQB-Pink comparisons for firms priced between $0.01 and
$0.10, and $1.00 and $5.00, respectively. Here, there is no significant difference in spreads
between OTCQX and OTCQB, and percentage spreads for OTCQB firms are higher than that of
OTC Pink firms. Generally, the results in Table 5 suggest that firms in higher information tiers
are more liquid than firms in lower information tiers.
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I extend this analysis to a multivariate setting and tabulate the results in Table 6. This
analysis is similar to regressions of PNT on price level indicator variables located in Table 4. In
Table 6, however, I consider only penny stocks and run a cross-sectional analysis within each
price group. Panel A (Panel B) presents results of Tobit regressions with PNT (Spread %) as the
dependent variable. The independent variables of interest are Pink and OTCQB, which are
indicator variables denoting a firm’s tier designation. In all specifications in both panels, both
Pink and OTCQB are positive, indicating that firms within these tiers have higher levels of PNT
and higher percentage spreads than OTCQX firms (the omitted group). Thus, firms in the top
tier, OTCQX, are the most liquid OTC securities. The magnitude of the coefficients on Pink and
OTCQB differ depending on price levels. Also of interest are the price indicator variables in the
first regression of each panel. Here, I consider all penny stocks and find that, after controlling for
a host of factors that affect PNT, securities trading at subpenny levels (the omitted group) are the
most liquid group in the study. In Panel A, all price level indicator variables have higher levels
of PNT than the omitted subpenny group. Similarly, in Panel B, all price level dummy variables
indicate that penny stocks over $0.01 have higher closing spreads than the subpenny group.
Considering the results from Panels A and B jointly, securities trading at prices below a penny
not only trade more frequently than other penny stocks, but have the lowest percentage spreads
as well. The most natural lottery candidates are the most liquid group in the study after
controlling for factors that influence PNT and Spread %.
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OTC VERSUS LISTED
Results from previous studies find a decrease in liquidity and an increase in volatility
around a firm’s move from a listed exchange to the OTC market. Both share prices and volume
decrease, while volatility and spreads (quoted and effective) increase (see Harris,
Panchapagesan, and Werner, 2008; and Macey, O’Hara, and Pompilio, 2008). As mentioned
earlier, Angel, Harris, Pauchapogesan, and Werner (2004) study involuntary delistings and find
that the further down a firm falls during the delisting process, the greater the decline in its
liquidity.
O’Hara, Saar, and Zhong (2014) state that the trading environment for penny stocks is
different from non-penny stocks. Nofsinger and Varma (2014) conclude that penny stocks seem
to have different characteristics and trading behavior than other OTC stocks priced over one
dollar. Additionally, in an analysis of firms moving from a listed exchange to the OTC market,
Macey, O’Hara, and Pompilio (2008) state that trading in different venues has different effects
on prices.
Liu, Rhee, and Zhang (2015) find that 29% of listed penny stocks are held by institutions.
Those held by institutions earn significant abnormal returns, while penny stocks lightly held by
institutions do not. OTC penny stocks, on the other hand, are primarily held by retail investors
and display less institutional ownership (Ang, Shtauber, and Tetlock, 2013; and Eraker and
Ready, 2015). OTC securities, in particular OTC penny stocks, are assets with lottery like
payoffs (Eraker and Ready; and Nofsinger and Varma, 2014). Also, OTC securities are difficult
to short (Ang, Shatauber, and Tetlock). Ang, Shtauber, and Tetlock (2013), Eraker and Ready
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(2015), and Bruggemann, Kaul, Luez, and Werner (2013) document negative average stock
returns and high return volatility for OTC stocks and suggest that these results are consistent
with investors seeking assets with lottery features. Lastly, due to the listing requirements, listed
low-priced securities are typically more transparent than penny stocks trading OTC. Ang,
Shatuaber, and Tetlock state that financial disclosure resolves uncertainty and reduces
divergence in opinion. Thus, listed firms, which are required to register with the SEC, should
display less divergence of opinion resulting in lower levels of daily price volatility.
Hypothesis 4: Low-priced, listed stocks (i.e. listed securities priced under $5.00) are
more liquid (as seen in number of trades, percentage of days with trading
activity, and closing bid-ask spreads) than OTC penny stocks.
Hypothesis 5: Daily price ranges for OTC penny stocks are larger than those of listed
securities trading under five dollars.
Summary liquidity metrics presented in Table 2 indicate that listed securities are more
liquid than their OTC counterparts. To confirm the results presented in Table 2, I employ a
difference-in-means test to compare liquidity metrics of listed securities relative to OTC
securities. The results of these tests are reported in Table 7. This time, I test liquidity metrics
between three groups based on the prices of the listed sample: those under $5.00, those
specifically priced between $0.10 and $1.00, and those priced between $1.00 and $5.00.
Regardless of liquidity metric (PNT, # Trades, Spread %) or price partition, low priced listed
securities are overwhelmingly more liquid than penny stocks. While listed securities under $5.00
exhibit greater price volatility throughout the trading day relative to OTC penny stocks, OTC
securities priced between $1.00 and $5.00 are less volatile than comparable listed securities.
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CONCLUSION
Previous studies of OTC securities apply heavy sample restrictions that remove some of
the nontrivial variation in OTC securities. For example, Eraker and Ready (2015) exclude nonUS stocks and those under $0.01. Bruggemann, Kaul, Luez, and Werner (2013) exclude firms
incorporated outside the U.S. Lastly, Ang, Shtauber, and Tetlock (2013) require stocks to trade
over $1 and have a market cap of at least $1 million. While these filters may be appropriate for
their studies, I intentionally study the securities filtered out from other research. A large portion
of OTC securities are penny stocks trading under $5.00. I first quantify the trading activity of
OTC penny stocks and compare liquidity metrics of these stocks relative to both non-penny OTC
stocks as well as to low-priced, listed securities.
Previous literature documents the lottery-like features of OTC securities. Until this point,
however, few studies have looked for trading consequences of these lottery characteristics. In
particular, I find that the lottery-like characteristics of OTC securities seem to generate more
investor interest in penny stocks than in their non-penny counterparts. Penny stocks trade more
than the higher priced, more “legitimate” OTC securities. On average, however, increased
investor interest does not lead to an improvement in market quality. In a comparison of liquidity
metrics between listed and OTC securities, I find that listed securities are more liquid than
comparable OTC securities.
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Table 1: Sample Description
This table classifies the sample of securities by price, listing designation, and tier designation for OTC securities. Panel A provides the
number of securities in the sample according to price partition and listing status. Panel B categorizes each price partition by tier. The
sample consists of common stocks and ordinary shares. Ordinary shares are common stock of foreign companies. Firms on OTCQX
meet the highest standards. OTCQB firms are current in their reporting, but do not qualify for OTCQX. OTC Pink firms are either
unable or willing to provide adequate levels of information and transparency. Securities not quoted on OTC Link ATS or on OTCBB
and are designated to the Grey Market.

# OTC Penny
# Listed
Panel B
Tier
OTCQX
OTCQB
OTC Pink
Grey
Total

< $0.01
2,002

[$0.01-$0.10)
1,909

[$0.10-$1.00)
2,199
63

[$1.00-$5.00)
1,177
611

≥ $5.00
1,936

< $0.01
0.04%
10.49%
66.71%
22.76%
100%

[$0.01-$0.10)
2.49%
22.63%
55.72%
19.16%
100%

[$0.10-$1.00)
5.52%
33.17%
42.22%
19.09%
100%

[$1.00-$5.00)
3.24%
31.58%
40.16%
25.02%
100%

≥ $5.00
3.29%
27.07%
35.50%
34.14%
100%

Total
9,223
674
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# Securities
PNT
# Trades
Spread %
Volume
$ Volume
Range %
# Mkt Makers
Turnover
Mkt Cap (1000s)

OTC
< $0.01
2,002

OTC
[$0.01-$0.10)
1,909

OTC
[$0.10-$1.00)
2,199

OTC
[$1.00-$5.00)
1,177

59.25
(69.43)
9.08
(2.73)
51.37
(43.40)
3,216,922
(134,318)
6,267
(302)
15.43
(11.99)
8.01
(7.74)
0.0059
(0.0013)
1,094
(206)

58.94
(70.57)
7.19
(2.58)
46.25
(36.90)
487,457
(31,587)
7,345
(1,117)
11.14
(8.63)
8.76
(8.03)
0.0027
(0.0006)
11,479
(2,023)

52.49
(58.49)
8.44
(3.18)
32.21
(18.82)
111,817
(17,150)
17,658
(4,802)
7.67
(5.70)
9.08
(8.37)
0.0013
(0.0004)
275,686
(13,782)

57.11
(67.92)
8.08
(2.63)
17.80
(6.05)
44,858
(5,639)
34,465
(11,183)
3.66
(1.52)
8.88
(8.56)
0.0008
(0.0001)
1,695,422
(88,447)

OTC
≥ $5.00
1,936
61.55
(69.43)
4.48
(2.14)
7.64
(2.45)
9,231
(1,580)
59,111
(27,708)
0.90
(0.35)
9.47
(9.10)
0.0005
(<0.0001)
4,740,820
(954,000)

Listed
[$0.10-$1.00)
63
1.01
(0)
1,097
(412)
2.23
(2.00)
686,193
(291,558)
500,507
(185,125)
9.21
(8.32)
33
(34)
10.65
(5.77)
53,925,255
(32,339,502)

Listed
[$1.00-$5.00)
611
2.06
(0)
1,375
(367)
1.50
(1.04)
672,445
(136,418)
2,224,325
(348,271)
5.90
(5.59)
32
(30)
9.80
(4.87)
169,509,864
(63,584,711)
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Table 2: Summary Statistics
This table provides summary statistics according to price and listing. PNT is the percentage of days of the sample period that a security does not
trade. # Trades is the number of trades by day. For listed securities, this metric represents the number of trades on NASDAQ. Spread % is the
difference in the closing bid-ask spread divided by the closing midpoint. Volume is total shares traded per day. $ Volume is daily dollar volume.
For listed securities, it is calculated as closing price multiplied by volume. Range % is daily high price minus daily low price divided by the
closing price. Mkt Makers is the number of market makers quoting a security. Turnover is daily volume divided by shares outstanding. Market
Cap is price multiplied by shares outstanding and is reported in thousands. Each variable is found at the security level first and then averaged.
Medians are reported in parentheses. All variables are trimmed at the 1% and 99% levels.
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Table 3: Differences in Liquidity and Market Quality Metrics by Price.
This table presents differences in averages for liquidity and market quality metrics of the securities in this study. PNT is the percentage of days
with no trading. # Trades is the average number of trades per day. Spread % is the closing ask minus closing bid divided by midpoint. Range %
is the average of the daily high price minus low price divided by the closing price. All variables are trimmed at the 1% and 99% levels.

PNT
PNT
PNT
PNT
PNT
PNT
PNT
# Trades
# Trades
# Trades
# Trades
# Trades
# Trades
# Trades
Spread %
Spread %
Spread %
Spread %
Spread %
Spread %
Spread %
Range %
Range %
Range %
Range %
Range %
Range %
Range %
***

< $0.01
59.25
59.25

Statistically

< $0.10

< $1.00

[$0.01$5.00)
55.85

< $5.00

≥ $0.01

[$0.10$5.00)

≥ $0.10

[$1.00$5.00)

≥ $1.00

≥ $5.00

57.38
59.10
59.10

54.10
56.81
56.72
56.72

57.11
59.87
56.78

61.55

9.08
9.08

7.91
6.99
8.16
8.16

8.32
6.91
8.26
8.26

8.08
5.83
8.23

4.48

51.37
51.37

34.20
28.14
48.88
48.88

27.37
21.13
42.82
42.82

17.80
11.92
38.94

7.64

15.43
15.43

8.02
6.10
13.32
13.32

6.26
4.30
11.27
11.27

3.66
1.94
10.02

significant

at

the

0.01

level;

0.90
**

Statistically

significant

at

the

0.05

level;

*

Statistically

significant

at

Diff
3.40***
1.87**
5.00***
2.28***
-0.39
-3.15***
-4.77***
1.17***
2.09***
-0.16
1.24***
0.18
2.43***
3.75***
17.17***
23.23***
21.51***
27.75***
25.02***
30.91***
31.30***
7.41***
9.33***
7.05***
9.02***
7.61***
9.33***
9.13***
the

0.10

t-stat
3.83
2.23
6.31
3.27
-0.36
-4.32
-5.64
2.80
5.54
-0.43
3.94
0.35
7.37
9.86
16.95
24.63
24.24
36.00
20.19
37.35
30.44
24.48
34.57
26.34
41.25
20.70
40.92
33.63
level
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Table 4 Liquidity Regressions Panel A. This table presents the results of Tobit and OLS regressions for PNT on a host of control variables. Range % is the
average of the daily high price minus low price divided by the closing price. # Mkt Makers is the average of the number of market makers that quote a security
throughout the day. Mkt Cap is the log of share price multiplied by shares outstanding. SEC is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm is registered with the
SEC, zero otherwise. Pink is a dummy variable equal to one if the security is designated to the OTC Pink Tier, zero otherwise. OTCQB is a dummy variable
equal to one if the security is designated to the OTCQB Tier, zero otherwise. Regressions contain price level indicator variables. All variables are trimmed at the
1% and 99% levels.

All (OLS)
-0.8796***
(-17.287)
-5.0719***
(-55.224)
-2.2241***
(-14.710)
-3.3234***
(-4.743)
12.4900***
(8.612)
15.4787***
(10.223)
-17.4355***

Pink (OLS)
-0.8097***
(-13.638)
-5.7471***
(-40.991)
-0.8973***
(-4.716)
-0.0682
(-0.073)

OTCQB
(OLS)
-0.7944***
(-9.144)
-4.7421***
(-35.164)
-2.5904***
(-7.133)
-5.5252***
(-4.362)

-0.2200

-37.1508***

-24.0551***

(-10.240)
-9.2564***

(-0.099)
6.4041***

(-13.049)
-21.6464***

-17.2983**

(-9.379)
-17.5131***

(-3.514)
-30.6652***

(-6.892)
-9.8641***

(3.308)
2.4849

(-10.474)
-17.2052***

(-2.587)
-23.7962***

(0.989)
1.2962

(-9.109)
-14.6409***

(-5.844)
-32.3459***

(-8.604)
-7.4707***

(1.449)
1.8532

(-9.891)
-13.4962***

(-4.774)
-25.9520***

(0.728)
123.8015***
(28.288)
3,510

(-7.474)
177.0844***
(26.300)
2,091

(-6.341)
300.5390***
(13.541)
285

(-6.080)
131.3672***
(38.988)
5,886
0.4637

(1.076)
114.2218***
(27.382)
3,510
0.4416

(-7.456)
157.2599***
(25.791)
2,091
0.5349

(-5.614)
267.7784***
(12.702)
285
0.6095

Pink (Tobit)
-0.8783***
(-13.431)
-6.4926***
(-40.980)
-1.0855***
(-5.470)
-0.4525
(-0.447)

OTCQB (Tobit)
-1.1281***
(-9.748)
-5.6102***
(-35.392)
-3.1400***
(-7.896)
-4.9241***
(-3.389)

< $0.01

All (Tobit)
-1.0023***
(-16.871)
-5.8555***
(-54.319)
-2.6083***
(-16.301)
-3.1396***
(-4.068)
13.7535***
(8.823)
16.7908***
(10.126)
-20.7773***

-0.9842

-47.3454***

[$0.01, $0.10)

(-11.127)
-10.9827***

(-0.419)
6.1336***

(-13.290)
-21.8963***

[$0.10, $1.00)

(-7.547)
-11.5626***

(3.018)
1.7634

[$1.00, $5.00)

(-9.453)
-8.9318***
(-6.894)
144.9972***
(40.060)
5,886

Range %
# Mkt Makers
Mkt Cap (log)
SEC
Pink
OTCQB

Constant
Observations
R-squared

OTCQX (Tobit)
-2.4071***
(-3.811)
-4.9738***
(-10.127)
-11.0516***
(-8.960)
5.1769
(1.340)

*** Statistically significant at the 0.01 level; ** Statistically significant at the 0.05 level; * Statistically significant at the 0.10 level

OTCQX (OLS)
-2.2888***
(-3.792)
-4.0114***
(-8.997)
-9.8584***
(-8.401)
3.3667
(0.946)
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Table 4 Panel B. This table presents the results of Tobit regressions for Spread% on a host of control variables. Range % is the average of the daily high price
minus low price divided by the closing price. # Mkt Makers is the average of the number of market makers that quote a security throughout the day. Mkt Cap is
the log of share price multiplied by shares outstanding. SEC is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm is registered with the SEC, zero otherwise. Pink is a
dummy variable equal to one if the security is designated to the OTC Pink Tier, zero otherwise. OTCQB is a dummy variable equal to one if the security is
designated to the OTCQB Tier, zero otherwise. #Trades is the average number of trades per day. Regressions contain price level indicator variables. All
variables are trimmed at the 1% and 99% levels.

Range %
# Mkt Makers
Mkt Cap (log)
SEC
Pink
OTCQB
<$0.01
[0.01, $0.10)
[$0.10, $1.00)
[$1.00, $5.00)
# Trades
Constant
Observations

All (Tobit)
0.6294***
(15.227)
-2.4730***
(-28.424)
-3.2773***
(-25.933)
2.4634***
(4.235)
8.0947***
(9.790)
5.2357***
(6.020)
-3.3049**
(-2.469)
4.4628***
(4.527)
3.4191***
(4.501)
0.4716
(0.654)
-0.1976***
(-13.111)
88.0675***
(31.934)
5,816

Pink (Tobit)
0.6477***
(13.028)
-2.5840***
(-19.533)
-3.5043***
(-20.765)
0.5875
(0.683)

OTCQB (Tobit)
0.7311***
(9.590)
-2.5845***
(-19.583)
-1.5902***
(-6.015)
2.6982***
(3.138)

OTCQX (Tobit)
0.3484*
(1.739)
-1.1462***
(-6.299)
-3.9430***
(-5.025)
1.8636
(1.136)

-1.7534
(-0.967)
6.6515***
(4.296)
1.9458
(1.626)
-0.7726
(-0.784)
-0.2895***
(-10.926)
101.6250***
(25.707)
3,446

-8.3472***
(-4.003)
2.4077*
(1.716)
6.7603***
(5.610)
2.6828**
(2.321)
-0.1152***
(-6.503)
64.2585***
(13.255)
2,086

11.4223***
(4.040)
-2.1754
(-1.097)
-3.1873**
(-2.075)
-0.0039
(-0.156)
88.1148***
(6.040)
284
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Table 5: Differences in Liquidity Metrics across Tiers
This table presents differences in means for liquidity and market quality metrics of the securities in this study during the sample period according
to price and tier. PNT is the percentage of days with no trading. # Trades is the average number of trades per day. Spread % is the closing ask
minus closing bid divided by midpoint. All variables are trimmed at the 1% and 99% levels.
Panel A: PNT
[$0.01-$0.10)
[$0.10-$1.00)
[$1.00-$5.00)
[$0.01-$0.10)
[$0.10-$1.00)
[$1.00-$5.00)
($0, $0.01)
[$0.01-$0.10)
[$0.10-$1.00)
[$1.00-$5.00)

QX
56.19
32.28
20.13
56.19
32.28
20.13

Panel B: # Trades
[$0.01-$0.10)
[$0.10-$1.00)
[$1.00-$5.00)
[$0.01-$0.10)
[$0.10-$1.00)
[$1.00-$5.00)
($0, $0.01)
[$0.01-$0.10)
[$0.10-$1.00)
[$1.00-$5.00)

QX
3.93
13.17
27.83
3.93
13.17
27.83

QB
34.36
37.85
45.87

55.57
54.04
55.83
52.03
55.57
54.04
55.83

Difference
21.83***
-5.57*
-25.73***
0.62
-21.77***
-35.69***
-35.62***
-21.21***
-16.89***
-9.96***

t-stat
5.03
-1.90
-4.93
0.14
-7.49
-6.95
-17.12
-12.65
-10.81
-4.60

Difference
-9.53***
-0.63
16.97***
-4.12*
6.32***
21.03***
23.79***
5.40***
6.96***
4.05***

t-stat
-3.45
-0.32
5.06
-1.82
5.10
8.55
15.77
5.62
8.33
3.81
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16.41
34.36
37.85
45.87

Pink

QB
13.46
13.80
10.86

33.66
13.46
13.80
10.86

Pink

8.06
6.84
6.80
9.87
8.06
6.84
6.80

*** Statistically significant at the 0.01 level; ** Statistically significant at the 0.05 level; * Statistically significant at the 0.10 level

Panel C: Spread %
[$0.01-$0.10)
[$0.10-$1.00)
[$1.00-$5.00)
[$0.01-$0.10)
[$0.10-$1.00)
[$1.00-$5.00)
($0, $0.01)
[$0.01-$0.10)
[$0.10-$1.00)
[$1.00-$5.00)

QX
33.48
12.13
4.35
33.48
12.13
4.35

QB
31.73
30.60
21.92

24.76
31.73
30.60
21.92

Pink

50.52
38.49
18.64
52.02
50.52
38.49
18.64

Difference
1.75
-18.47***
-17.58***
-17.04***
-26.26***
-14.29***
-27.26***
-18.79***
-7.89***
3.28*

t-stat
0.45
-6.95
-4.28
-3.55
-7.85
-3.15
-12.74
-10.49
-4.71
1.75
99

*** Statistically significant at the 0.01 level; ** Statistically significant at the 0.05 level; * Statistically significant at the 0.10 level
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Table 6: Price Regressions Panel A This table presents the results of Tobit regressions for PNT (Panel A) and Spread % (Panel B) on a host
of control variables. Individual regressions are run according to price. PNT is the percentage of days during the sample period that a firm does
not trade. Spread % (the closing ask minus closing bid divided by midpoint) is the dependent variable in the last four models. Range % is the
average of the daily high price minus low price divided by the closing price. # Mkt Makers is the average of the number of market makers that
quote a security throughout the day. Mkt Cap is the log of share price multiplied by shares outstanding. SEC is an indicator variable equal to
one if the firm is registered with the SEC, zero otherwise. Pink is a dummy variable equal to one if the security is designated to the OTC Pink
Tier, zero otherwise. OTCQB is a dummy variable equal to one if the security is designated to the OTCQB Tier, zero otherwise. Regressions
contain price level indicator variables. All variables are trimmed at the 1% and 99% levels.

< $5.00

($0, $0.01)

[$0.01-$0.10)

[$0.10-$1.00)

[$1.00-$5.00)

-0.9107***

-0.9084***

-0.9541***

-0.5843***

-1.7385***

(-16.009)

(-12.094)

(-9.757)

(-4.471)

(-5.766)

-6.5060***

-6.3611***

-6.3400***

-6.4721***

-6.7026***

(-54.977)

(-18.513)

(-27.415)

(-35.231)

(-24.841)

-1.5440***

-2.3833***

-1.7651***

-0.9756***

-0.8479**

(-8.273)

(-5.104)

(-4.345)

(-2.755)

(-2.177)

SEC

-0.1573

1.1485

-2.1992

-1.7829

0.2796

(-0.185)

(0.841)

(-1.405)

(-1.024)

(0.103)

Pink

18.3591***

18.6861***

7.5721***

17.8635***

26.0449***

(11.577)

(8.603)

(2.982)

(8.270)

(6.175)

OTCQB

18.0972***

5.7097*

22.0310***

36.0663***

(10.545)

(1.951)

(8.950)

(7.579)

[$0.01, $0.10)

9.4832***

Range %
# Mkt Makers
Mkt Cap (log)

(9.094)
[$0.10, $1.00)

7.9790***

[$1.00, $5.00)

8.7419***

(6.162)
(5.146)
# Trades
Constant
Observations

109.0642***

119.8982***

132.7686***

103.7636***

98.3461***

(34.275)

(20.652)

(20.509)

(16.151)

(10.870)

4,825

1,135

1,254

1,640

796

*** Statistically significant at the 0.01 level; ** Statistically significant at the 0.05 level; * Statistically significant at the 0.10 level
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+ 𝛽11 #𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖

Table 6: Panel B This table presents the results of Tobit regressions for PNT (Panel A) and Spread % (Panel B) on a host of control variables.
Individual regressions are run according to price. PNT is the percentage of days during the sample period that a firm does not trade. Spread %
(the closing ask minus closing bid divided by midpoint) is the dependent variable in the last four models. Range % is the average of the daily
high price minus low price divided by the closing price. # Mkt Makers is the average of the number of market makers that quote a security
throughout the day. Mkt Cap is the log of share price multiplied by shares outstanding. SEC is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm is
registered with the SEC, zero otherwise. Pink is a dummy variable equal to one if the security is designated to the OTC Pink Tier, zero
otherwise. OTCQB is a dummy variable equal to one if the security is designated to the OTCQB Tier, zero otherwise. Regressions contain
price level indicator variables. All variables are trimmed at the 1% and 99% levels.

Range %
# Mkt Makers
Mkt Cap (log)
SEC
Pink
OTCQB
[$0.01, $0.10)
[$0.10, $1.00)
[$1.00, $5.00)
# Trades
Constant
Observations

< $5.00
0.6114***
(14.571)
-2.7491***
(-27.308)
-3.5755***
(-22.681)
2.1151***
(3.227)
9.8929***
(10.631)
7.4673***
(7.315)
8.3602***
(9.499)
7.7543***
(7.199)
5.0349***
(3.792)
-0.1856***
(-11.490)
89.7352***
(34.087)
4,820

($0, $0.01)
0.4496***
(8.646)
-3.6597***
(-12.453)
-2.3711***
(-5.944)
-0.5889
(-0.515)
7.4822***
(5.725)

[$0.01-$0.10)
0.3963***
(4.596)
-3.5012***
(-18.120)
-2.9788***
(-7.714)
-0.6801
(-0.561)
9.3626***
(4.155)
4.9677**
(2.050)

[$0.10-$1.00)
1.0817***
(10.964)
-2.3557***
(-13.689)
-3.8108***
(-11.734)
3.3922**
(2.419)
10.2030***
(10.173)
8.8378***
(6.469)

[$1.00-$5.00)
1.0280***
(2.813)
-2.3578***
(-10.505)
-2.0256***
(-6.078)
6.3903***
(3.525)
5.2044***
(3.394)
5.8533***
(3.204)

-0.1899***
(-8.403)
90.4006***
(18.172)
1,134

-0.1729***
(-5.133)
101.9562***
(15.425)
1,253

-0.1492***
(-4.498)
91.5430***
(15.752)
1,637

-0.0965***
(-2.684)
61.3098***
(8.258)
796

*** Statistically significant at the 0.01 level; ** Statistically significant at the 0.05 level; * Statistically significant at the 0.10 level
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Listed

OTC

Difference

t-stat

PNT (<$5.00)

1.96

56.78

-54.82***

-41.95

PNT [$0.10-$1.00)

1.01

52.49

-51.48***

-11.87

PNT [$1.00-$5.00)

2.06

57.11

-55.04***

-39.38

# Trades (<$5.00)

1358.10

8.23

1349.9***

31.72

# Trades [$0.10-$1.00)

1097.30

8.44

1088.9***

29.13

# Trades [$1.00-$5.00)

1374.90

8.08

1366.8***

12.57

Spread % (<$5.00)

1.57

38.94

-37.37***

-27.35

Spread % [$0.10-$1.00)

2.23

32.21

-29.97***

-6.75

Spread % [$1.00-$5.00)

1.50

17.80

-16.31***

-14.94

Range % (<$5.00)

6.21

10.02

-3.81***

-8.33

Range % [$0.10-$1.00)

9.21

7.67

1.54

1.36

Range % [$1.00-$5.00)

5.90

3.67

2.24***

9.10

*** Statistically significant at the 0.01 level; ** Statistically significant at the 0.05 level; * Statistically significant at the 0.10 level
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Table 7: Differences in Liquidity Metrics between Listed Securities and OTC Securities
This table presents differences in means for liquidity and market quality metrics of the securities in this study according to listing status and price.
PNT is the percentage of days with no trading. # Trades is the average number of trades per day. For listed securities, # Trades represents the
number of trades on NASDAQ. Spread % is the closing ask minus closing bid divided by midpoint. Range % is the average of the daily high price
minus low price divided by the closing price. All variables are trimmed at the 1% and 99% levels.
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Figure 1: OTC Stocks by Price
This figure categorizes the full sample of OTC stocks according to price.

25.00%
20.00%
15.00%
10.00%
5.00%
0.00%
<$0.01

[$0.01-$0.10) [$0.10-$1.00) [$1.00-$5.00)
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Figure 2: OTC Firms by Price and Tier
These figures categorize firms within each tier according to price. Figure 2a describes OTCQX
firms. Figure 2b categorizes OTCQB firms. Figure 2c classifies OTC Pink Firms. Lastly, Figure
2d classifies Grey Firms.
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Figure 2b
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Figure 2c
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Figure 2d
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PART 3: RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND DIVERGENCE OF OPINION: SHORT SELLING IN
THE OTC MARKET
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PART 3

INTRODUCTION
In contrast to their listed peers, OTC securities are more illiquid, have minimal disclosure
requirements, and are primarily held by noninstituional (i.e. retail) investors (Ang, Shatauber,
and Tetlock, 2013; hereafter, AST). Since institutions are typically the primary lenders of shares,
short selling in the OTC market is “difficult, expensive, and rare.” Nagel (2005) uses
institutional ownership as a proxy for short sales and finds that when institutional ownership is
low, stock available for shorting is extremely limited and short selling more expensive. Shorting
difficulties also arise because brokerages may not allow investors to short sell OTC stocks at all,
or if they do, may levy additional restrictions on investors including a minimum price threshold
(typically one dollar) or add additional margin constraints (Eraker and Ready, 2014). Even
without these constraints, shares of OTC securities are often not available to short. Eraker and
Ready suspect the difficulty shorting OTC stocks is one possible explanation for negative
average OTC stock returns. AST also document negative OTC stock returns resulting from
behavioral biases and limits to arbitrage. The negative returns are driven by stocks with higher
levels of investor disagreement. Restrictions on short selling can lead to such overpriced
securities that stocks with low systematic risk may have higher returns than stocks with higher
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systematic risk. AST and Eraker and Ready conclude that OTC stocks are assets with lottery-like
payoffs, and Nofinsger and Varma (2014) find that OTC investors have preferences for lotterylike stocks. Short selling difficulties in the OTC marketplace not only contribute to the large
negative returns of OTC stocks, but also add to the lottery-like characteristics of these securities
(Eraker and Ready). Bruggemann, Kaul, Leuz, and Werner (2013) state that if the OTC market
consists of retail investors seeking lottery-like payoffs, then together with restrictions on short
selling, sophisticated investors may not be willing to participate in the market.
In this paper, my purpose is twofold. First, I study the relation between short interest and
the lottery characteristics (i.e. prices, volatility, and returns) of OTC securities. Eraker and Ready
(2015) suggest short selling difficulties add to the lottery-like characteristics of OTC securities. It
is an open empirical question, however, as to the relation between short interest and stock and
firm characteristics, in particular lottery characteristics. Also, given that OTC investors are
primarily concerned about stock liquidity, which in the OTC market includes the ability to trade
a stock at all (Ang, Shtauber, and Tetlock, 2013), I also examine the relation between short
selling and liquidity determinants.
Second, the new OTC information tier designations of the securities in this study provide
a unique setting to examine the effects of information disclosure on short selling in the OTC
market. In an effort to improve transparency in this market, OTC Markets Group currently
organizes firms trading OTC into one of three tiers (OTCQX, OTCQB, and OTC Pink) based on
the quantity and quality of information firms make available. Firms designated to either of the
top tiers, OTCQX or OTCQB, are required to meet certain financial and disclosure standards.
While OTCQX and OTCQB firms must be current in their reporting, OTC Pink firms have
variable reporting standards and are either unable or unwilling to provide adequate information
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and transparency. I examine the relation between tier designation and short interest. Information
disclosure allows shareholders and creditors to evaluate potential returns and monitor the use of
capital (Beyer, Cohen, Lys, and Walther, 2010). Therfore, greater transparency resolves
uncertainty and reduces information asymmetry and divergence of opinion (Ang, Shatuaber, and
Tetlock, 2013). As a result, I expect to find firms in higher information tiers to have less short
interest.
While financial transparency may alleviate price discrepancies among OTC investors,
OTC firms may have “private incentives to… withhold or manipulate information in certain
situations, e.g. when performance is poor” (Bushee and Leuz, 2005). As a result, OTC stocks are
inherently risky and difficult to price because they trade infrequently, have variable reporting
standards, and provide very little information to investors. OTC firms are notorious for their
information asymmetry and based on their price, volatility, and illiquidity levels, are subject to
deception, manipulation, fraud, and most recently to “pump and dump” spam campaigns (see, for
example, Bollen and Christie, 2009, and Hu, McInish, and Zeng, 2010).
My results indicate that larger, more liquid stocks, and securities of firms registered with
the SEC, are easier to short. While short interest is directly related to lottery characteristics like
price and liquidity, I find no relation between short interest and daily price volatility. I also find
that firms in higher information tiers have less short interest than firms in lower information
tiers. This result is in line with AST (2013) who suggest that information disclosure reduces
divergence of opinion. Additionally, although ADRs trading in the OTC market have larger
institutional participation than common stocks or ordinary shares (Jiang, Petroni, and Wang,
2013), ADRs tend to have less short interest than other security types. I also study the daily
return performances of securities with differing levels of short interest to determine if the
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performance of OTC securities behaves as predicted by a theoretical model provided by Ang,
Shtauber, and Tetlock (2013). Lastly, I find that firms with higher levels of short interest have
more positive return days than firms with less short interest. Overall, my results provide support
for studies suggesting that the difficulty shorting OTC stocks adds to the lottery-like features of
these securities. My results also support Bollen and Christie’s (2009) claim that the OTC market
is the wild, wild west of securities trading.
My results are in line with theoretical papers such as Miller (1977) and Diamond and
Verrecchia (1987), who suggest that restrictions on short selling activity, coupled with higher
levels investor disagreement, inhibit negative information from being incorporated into stock
prices. When shorting is difficult, disproportionate weight is given to optimistic return forecasts,
which leads to widespread overpricing (Figlewski, 1981). Empirical studies of listed securities
support these conjectures. Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2008), Diether, Lee, and Werner (2009),
and Boehmer and Wu (2013) find that short-selling arbitrage activity contributes to efficient
market pricing, keeping security prices in line with their true value.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
Studies of OTC securities comment on the difficulties shorting OTC stocks (see for
example, AST, 2013; Eraker and Ready, 2013; Bruggemann, Kaul, Leuz, and Werner, 2013; and
Angel, Harris, Pauchapogesan, and Werner, 2004). Few studies explore the topic further. AST
study OTC securities priced over one dollar and find that relative to listed stocks, OTC stocks
have less intuitional investors, are more illiquid, and disclose less information. While the size,
value, and volatility return premiums are similar to listed markets, the OTC market has an
illiquidity (momentum) premium that is higher (lower) than in listed markets. Additionally, AST
state that OTC traders are primarily retail investors who may not pay attention to firms’
fundamentals. AST document negative OTC stock returns resulting from behavioral biases and
limits to arbitrage, and note that this negative performance is driven by stocks with higher levels
of investor disagreement.
In a subsample of 50 OTC stocks and 50 listed securities, AST (2013) find that average
short interest as a percentage of floating shares for OTC (listed) securities is 0.5% (4.1%) and is
higher than 0.1% for 44% (100%) of their sample. However, they find that a retail trader could
only short one of the 50 OTC stocks in their sample, and suggest that limits to short selling
extend to the entire OTC market. AST argue that the higher proportions of retail investors may
lead to greater disagreement on prices, which as a result, create pervasive overpricing in the OTC
market. The authors provide an OTC pricing model that shows that the costs of short selling
discourage pessimistic investor participation. Higher levels of overconfidence produce
widespread overpricing, which results in negative risk adjusted returns. AST suggest that firms
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with less financial disclosure have greater levels of investor disagreement and overpricing.
Disclosure of financial information resolves uncertainty and reduces divergence of opinion
among overconfident investors.
Eraker and Ready (2014) find that the distribution of OTC stock returns is positively
skewed. While most OTC stocks have negative average returns, some perform well. Eraker and
Ready attribute this negative return premium to investors’ preference for positively skewed
lottery-like assets. Eraker and Ready suspect the difficulty in shorting OTC stocks adds to the
average negative returns they document, but state that the return performance of OTC stocks
might also result from investor preferences for lottery-like assets. Bruggemann, Kaul, Leuz, and
Werner (2013) find that OTC investors pay attention to information differences across firms and
venues and transact accordingly. They conclude that OTC firms tend to be small penny stocks
with negative average returns and high return volatility (i.e. assets with lottery-like payoffs).
However, they do not find return differences between the OTC information tiers and explain
their results through retail investor preferences for lottery-like assets and short-sale constraints.
They argue that such restrictions may lead sophisticated investors to withdraw from the market,
which may make it more difficult to price securities and in turn find return differences between
the different information tiers. Bruggemann, Kaul, Leuz, and Werner believe the lower market
quality they document is a result of low investor participation.
There is a substantial body of literature that examines short-selling in listed securities. In
a seminal piece, Miller (1977) suggests that short-sale constraints prevent investors with negative
information from participating in the market. Consequently, a disproportionate weight is given to
optimistic return forecasts, which leads to widespread overpricing (Figlewski, 1981). Diamond
and Verrecchia (1987) show restrictions on short selling reduce pricing efficiency as stocks
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adjust to positive news much quicker than they do negative news. Unlike Miller (1977),
however, they state that rational investors will expect a reduction in pricing efficiency and
modify valuations accordingly so that no overpricing exists. Hong and Stein (2003) hypothesize
that when investors have divergent opinions, short-sale constraints can lead to inflated stock
prices followed by crashes. Chang, Cheng, and Yu (2007) posit that greater divergence of
opinion leads to a more overvalued stock price.
Empirical studies of listed securities support some of these theories. Boehmer, Jones, and
Zhang (2008), Diether, Lee, and Werner (2009), and Boehmer and Wu (2013) find that shortselling arbitrage activity keeps prices in line with their true value and contributes to efficient
stock prices by correcting pricing errors. Cohen, Diether, and Malloy (2007), along with
Boehmer and Wu find that short sellers contribute to price discovery. Since short sellers are
informed traders (Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang; Christophe, Ferri, and Hsieh, 2010; Karpoff and
Lou, 2010; and Engleberg, Reed, and Riggenberg, 2012), restrictions to their activity reduce
market efficiency. Edwards and Hanley (2010) find that short selling does not lead to elevated
levels of IPO underpricing, but is instead an integral part to aftermarket trading. Restrictions on
short selling may have unexpected consequences as well. Battalio and Schultz (2011) find that
the 2008 short sale ban affected the derivatives market as seen in increased trading costs of
options and the decoupling of option and stock prices.
Boehmer, Huszer, and Jordan (2010) look at stocks with lower levels of short interest and
find that they outperform stocks heavily shorted. Returns to the portfolio of lightly shorted stocks
is greater in absolute value than returns to the portfolio of heavily shorted stocks. Their results
indicate that short sellers avoid undervalued securities and sell overvalued securities.
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Critics of short selling state that these traders create negativity and add downward
pressure to stock prices. Blau, Van Ness, Van Ness, and Wood (2010) find elevated (suppressed)
levels of short-selling on days when the market is down (up), while Brunnermeir and Pedersen
(2005) suggest that short sellers can prey on other investors. Shikilko, Van Ness, and Van Ness
(2012) study periods with downward price pressures in individual stocks and find that short
sellers exacerbate price declines. However, they find no short selling abuses, and in particular,
that liquidity-demanding non-short volume primarily drives price declines. Likewise, Jain, Jain,
and McInish (2012) do not find elevated levels of short selling on days with extreme downward
movements around their study of SEC Rule 201. Diether, Lee, and Werner (2009) study the
suspension of the short-sale price test as part of the REG SHO Pilot program and find that short
sales as a fraction of share volume increases. They find no evidence of an increase in excess
downside volatility or a decrease in returns around the REG SHO implementation.
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DATA
Data in this study is provided by OTC Markets Group and covers all trading days
beginning February 18th, 2014, and ending March 6th, 2015. The data contains comprehensive
end-of-day/closing trading and quoting information. The files are similar to CRSP files, but
supply information specific to OTC firms including tier designation, third-party sponsors, and a
caveat emptor flag. OTC Markets Group identifies securities within each tier that are subject to
a stock spam campaign, fraud or criminal investigation, undisclosed corporate actions (e.g.
reverse merger, stock split, name change), or a trading suspension/halt (among other reasons)
with a Caveat Emptor (i.e. buyer beware) flag. Investors are encouraged to exercise additional
caution and perform a thorough examination of securities with this flag before investing. OTC
Markets Group also provide a security data file for February 18th, 2014, and March 6th, 2015,
which contains shares outstanding.
Recent studies of the OTC market apply nontrivial restrictions on their sample, thereby
removing some of the important variation in this marketplace. For example, Eraker and Ready
(2015) exclude non-US stocks, ADRs, and securities priced under $0.01. Bruggemann, Kaul,
Luez, and Werner (2013) exclude firms incorporated outside the US. Ang, Shtauber, and Tetlock
(2013) require stocks to trade over $1.00 and have a market cap of at least $1 million. In
contrast, I consider all domestic and international securities alike, without restrictions on firm
size. To be included in my sample I require a firm to trade at least ten times and report shares
outstanding. Due to the time period of my sample, the nature of the firms in the sample, and the
bi-monthly reporting of short interest, I remove any firms that do not report short interest in 2013
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or later. Because I study the effects of tier designation on short selling, I require firms to remain
in the same information tier throughout the sample period. I consider all common stock, ordinary
shares, or American Depository Receipts (ADRs), without additional restrictions on type or size.
Ordinary shares are common stock of international firms. ADRs are issued by a U.S. depository
bank and provide investors the opportunity to own and trade international securities in U.S.
dollars during normal U.S. trading hours. ADRs tend to be larger OTC securities and have more
institutional ownership than non ADRs (Jiang, Petroni, and Wang, 2013). Lastly, I trim the
sample at the 1% level to remove the impact of outliers and possible data errors.
There are a wide variety of global securities trading in the OTC marketplace, some of
which are highly illiquid and trade infrequently during my sample period. In Panel A of Table 1,
I classify the sample of firms according to security type and tier designation. I study over 8,000
OTC securities including more than 4,000 common stocks, 3,000 ordinary shares and 1,000
ADRs. The largest portion of my sample trade in the OTC Pink tier. Overall, the firms in the
sample are extremely illiquid. As seen in Panel B, these securities trade every other day (PNT of
49.96) and only trade an average of 11.23 times per day on the days when they trade. While the
average price of the securities in the sample is $8.59, the median price is under one dollar
($0.67). As mentioned previously, OTC securities are extremely difficult to short, in part due to
the lack of shares available for shorting. The average amount of shares available to short is less
than one percent of the available shares outstanding.
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HYPOTHESES AND RESULTS
Kumar (2009) identifies low-priced stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility and high
idiosyncratic skewness as lotteries, and suggests that individual investors have preferences for
stocks with lottery-like characteristics. Eraker and Ready (2015) also argue that some investors
might have preferences for stocks with lottery features and are thus willing to accept negative
returns for securities with lottery features. Eraker and Ready hypothesize that short selling
difficulties in the OTC market not only contribute to the large negative returns of OTC stocks,
but also add to the lottery-like features of these securities. It is an open empirical question,
however, as to the relation between short interest and stock and firm characteristics, in particular
the relation between short selling in the OTC market and the lottery characteristics of these
securities. Also, given that OTC investors are primarily concerned about stock liquidity, which in
the OTC market includes the ability to trade a stock at all (Ang, Shtauber, and Tetlock, 2013), it
is important to examine the relation between short selling and liquidity determinants.
AST (2013) proxy investor disagreement using illiquidity, size, return volatility, and
value premiums to proxy for investor disagreement. Their model predicts greater overpricing and
differences in opinion with higher levels of trading volume, return volatility, firm size, and
market-to-book ratio. AST assume that it is more difficult for retail investors to short small
stocks. They find that negative OTC stock returns are driven by stocks with the most trading
activity (implying elevated levels of investor disagreement). On the other hand, Diether, Lee,
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and Werner (2009) study the suspension of the short-sale price test as part of the REG SHO Pilot
program and find that short sales as a fraction of share volume increases. However, they find no
evidence of an increase in excess downside volatility or a decrease in returns around the REG
SHO implementation. Given these findings above, I offer the following two hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1: Stocks with higher levels of volatility will have more short interest than
firms with lower levels of volatility.
Hypothesis 2: Stocks that trade more frequently (trade on more days) will have higher
levels of short interest than firms that trade less frequently.
To address Hypothesis 1 (Hypothesis 2), I compare short interest between firms within
differing volatility and illiquidity quartiles. I first sort firms based on average daily volatility
(illiquidity) over the sample period. I then compare the amount of short interest between firms in
the highest volatility (illiquidity) quartile to firms in the lowest volatility (illiquidity) quartile. I
define volatility as a firm’s daily price range expressed as a percentage of its closing price. I
measure illiquidity with PNT, the percentage of days during the sample period that a firm does
not trade. PNT is used by AST (2013) and Bruggemann, Kaul, Leuz, and Werner (2013) in their
analyses of OTC securities. Results in Panel B of Table 2 suggest that securities experiencing
greater daily price volatility (as defined by daily price range expressed as a percent of the closing
price) have less short interest than firms with less price volatility. This goes against what is
proposed in Hypothesis 1. Regarding illiquidity, I find no difference in short interest based on
PNT quartiles. The most illiquid firms, as represented by PNT, have levels of short interest that
are the same as the most liquid firms. The differences in means, as seen in both PNT quartiles
and # Trades quartiles, are not statistically different from zero. These results are also in contrast
to that proposed in Hypothesis 2.
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Nofsinger and Varma (2014) use the one dollar price threshold to identify lottery stocks
in the OTC market. Eraker and Ready (2014) state that many brokerages do not allow short
selling in stocks priced below one dollar. Since many penny stocks are priced below one dollar
(Davis, 2015), practically worthless, I expect less divergence of opinion for OTC penny stocks.
Additionally, Miller (1977) argues that “the riskiest stocks are also those about which there is the
greatest divergence of opinion.” Consequently, I propose Hypothesis 3 below.
Hypothesis 3: Stocks priced over one dollar will be easier to short (i.e. have more short
interest) than stocks priced under one dollar.
I compare short interest for firms above or below the $1.00 penny stock threshold.
Results in Panel C of Table 2 suggest that lower priced firms have less short interest than higher
priced firms. In particular, I use both a one dollar and a five dollar price threshold as a penny
stock indicator. Using either classification, I find that higher priced OTC securities have more
short interest than penny stocks, as predicted in Hypothesis 3.
I address Hypothesis 1, Hypothesis 2, and Hypothesis 3 in a multivariate setting as well
by examining the relation between Short Interest and these firm and security characteristics.
Since I am specifically interested in studying the relation between short interest and the lottery
features of these securities, I include price, and volatility, and liquidity determinants previously
documented for listed securities. Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2000) document common
liquidity determinants that include volatility, volume, and price. For my analysis, I include PNT
and # Trades (as an activity proxies), Price, firm size (Mkt Cap), and Range (as a risk proxiy).
Since firms registered with the SEC are required to disclose important financial information, I
include an SEC dummy variable (as an information proxy). SEC is an indicator variable equal to
one if the firm is registered with the SEC, zero otherwise. I average each independent variable at

123

the daily level and regress Short Interest on these firm and security characteristics. Since the
dependent variable is bounded between 0 and 1, I present results for Tobit analyses in Table 3.
All variables are trimmed at the 1% and 99% levels to remove the impact of outliers and possible
data errors.
As seen in equation (1) of Table 3, the negative (positive) coefficient on PNT (# Trades)
suggests that firms that trade more often tend to have more short interest. The signs of the
coefficients are in line with Hypothesis 2. While neither Price nor Range are significant
predictors of Short Interest, as seen in equation (1), I find that larger firms and firms registered
with the SEC have higher levels of short interest, as seen in the positive coefficients on Mkt Cap
and SEC, respectively. The lack of significance on price and volatility, in contrast to Hypothesis
1 and Hypothesis 3, is surprising given the previous literature’s assumption that short interest is
related to the lottery features of OTC securities.
Nofsinger and Varma suggest that OTC securities priced below one dollar are lottery
stocks, as defined by Kumar (2009). To address Hypothesis 3 in a multivariate setting, I include
a price indicator variable equal to one if a security has an average price below one dollar, and
zero otherwise. As reported in equation (2) of Table 3, the coefficient of <$1.00 indicates that
penny stocks (as defined by Nofsinger and Varma) priced below one dollar are more difficult to
short than firms priced over one dollar. Additionally, I find (weak) significance on Range,
suggesting that firms with greater volatility have higher levels of short interest. In total, I find
support for Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3, but only mild support for Hypothesis 1.
In Figure 1, I report short interest as a percentage of shares outstanding, by firm price.
Firms priced above one dollar have short interest levels similar to what is reported by AST
(2013) for their subsample of 50 OTC firms. Firms in the price partitions below one dollar have
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short interest percentage values ranging from 0.06% (as seen in the group priced between $0.01
and $0.10) to 0.15% (as seen in the group priced between the $0.10-$1.00 group). While all of
the levels reported in Figure 1 are low relative to listed securities (see AST, 2013), it is worth
noting that shares are actually available for shorting even in the lowest priced OTC securities.
Divergence of opinion, as evidenced by the presence of short interest, exists even in securities
that are almost practically worthless (i.e. penny stocks trading in subpenny increments near
$0.00).
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SHORT INTEREST AND ADRS
The next portion of my empirical analysis examines the relation between short interest
and security type. AST (2013) argue that investor disagreement is higher in the OTC market than
listed markets due to lower disclosure requirements and higher proportions of retail investors.
AST also state that institutions hold 26% of OTC stocks and 71% of comparable listed stocks.
Nagel (2005) uses institutional ownership as a proxy for short sales and finds that when
institutional ownership is low, stock available for shorting is limited and shorting is more
expensive. While institutions are the primary lenders of shares (AST, 2013), many professional
investors never sell short (Nagel, 2005).

AST (2013) show that the return premiums for

illiquidity, volatility, value and size are larger in OTC stocks that are not held by institutions.
Because (i) Jiang, Petroni, and Wang (2013) state that American Depository Receipts (ADRs)
tend to be larger OTC securities that have more institutional ownership than non ADRs, and (ii)
OTC ADRs are similar to listed securities (Bollen and Christie, 2009), I predict the following in
Hypothesis 4 below.
Hypothesis 4: Shares of OTC ADRs will have higher levels of short interest relative to
common stock and ordinary shares (i.e. common stock of foreign
companies).
As seen in Panel A of Table 4, I find that ADRs have less short interest than non-ADRs.
This result is in contrast to Hypothesis 4 above. This outcome is unexpected given that ADRs
most closely resemble listed securities, in addition to the fact that ADRs typically display higher
levels of institutional ownership. This result is, however, in line with Nagel (2005) who states
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that many professional investors may never sell short. These results may also suggest that stocks
with greater institutional participation (and less short interest) are priced more efficiently.
Consequently, the absence of short interest in this situation, indicating less divergence of opinion
among investors, could be good news for future stock returns (Boehmer, Huszer, and Jordan,
2010).
I next include ADR to the multivariate setting presented in Table 3. ADR is an indicator
variable equal to one if the security is an American Depository Receipt, zero otherwise. The
negative coefficient of ADR, as reported in Panel B of Table 4, indicates that ADRs have lower
levels of short interest relative to common stock and ordinary shares. This sign agrees with the
univariate results in Panel A and is, again, opposite the proposed direction in Hypothesis 4. All
of the remaining coefficients have the same sign as in previous specifications, except for SEC.
After including ADR, the positive coefficient on SEC disappears indicating that there are no
significant differences in short interest between firms registered with the SEC relative to firms
that are not registered with the SEC. ADR turns out not only to be highly significant, but an
important control variable in future specifications.
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SHORT INTEREST BY TIER
In Appendix A of their paper, AST (2013) provide an OTC pricing model that shows the costs of
short selling discourage pessimistic investor participation. Higher levels of overconfidence
produce widespread overpricing, which results in negative risk adjusted returns. AST suggest
that firms with less financial disclosure will have greater levels of investor disagreement and
overpricing. However, disclosure of financial information resolves uncertainty and reduces the
difference in opinion of overconfident investors. Their model predicts greater overpricing and
differences in opinion with higher levels of trading volume, return volatility, firm size, and
market-to-book ratio. These relations are even stronger for stocks with greater investor
overconfidence and those with less financial disclosure. Assuming that greater transparency and
financial disclosure resolves uncertainty and reduces information asymmetry and divergence of
opinion (Ang, Shatuaber, and Tetlock, 2013), then I expect Hypothesis 5 below to hold.
Hypothesis 5: Firms in higher information tiers will have less short interest than firms in
lower information tiers.
To test Hypothesis 5, I first calculate the difference in means of short interest for firms by
tier designation. Recall, firms in the highest information tier, OTCQX, meet the highest possible
financial and transparency standards required by the OTC Markets Group. OTCQB firms must
also provide financial disclosure, but fail to meet all of the conditions of the top information tier
designation. OTC Pink firms, on the other hand, are not subject to any minimum financial or
reporting requirements. Firms that do not quote trade in the Grey Market. The results of this
analysis, reported in Table 5, indicate that firms in the highest information tiers (OTCQX and
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OTCQB) have less short interest than firms in either the Pink tier or the Grey Market. I find no
statistical significance between short interest between the top two tiers (OTCQX versus OTCQB)
or the bottom designations (OTC Pink versus Grey Market). These non-results for differences
between the top two tiers (and bottom two tiers) should not be surprising. While both OTCQX
and OTCQB firms must be current in their reporting, many OTCQB firms do not qualify for the
top tier simply because they do not pass a minimum bid price test of $0.10. Similarly, neither
OTC Pink nor Grey Market firms have no financial or disclosure requirements.
To obtain a better understanding of the relation between short interest and information, I
examine Hypothesis 5 in a multivariate setting as well. I perform a similar analysis as in Table 3
and Table 4, but this time add information tier designation dummy variables indicating a firm’s
trading venue. Since many firms change tiers during the sample period, I only analyze firms that
remain in the same tier for the entire sample period. This provides the cleanest look at the
relation between short interest and tier designation. Results of this regression analysis are
reported in Table 6. All of the tier dummy variables are significant. The coefficient of OTCQB is
negative suggesting that OTCQB firms have less short interest than OTCQX firms (the omitted
group). However, firms trading in the OTC Pink tier and the Grey Market have higher levels of
short interest than firms in the top tier, OTCQX. These results confirm the univariate outcomes
presented in Table 5 and also add support to Hypothesis 5 above. My results are also in line with
AST’s overpricing model. After including the tier designation dummy variables, the coefficient
of SEC becomes positive. All of the coefficients in Table 6 have identical signs as those in Table
4.
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POSITIVE/NEGATIVE RETURN DAYS
While short selling difficulties are suspected to contribute to the negative returns of OTC
securities (Eraker and Ready, 2015, and Bruggemann, Kaul, Leuz, and Werner, 2013), no studies
securities have directly examined the effects of short selling difficulties on OTC stock returns.
Studies of listed securities do, however, analyze the relation between short interest and returns.
Boehmer, Huszer, and Jordan (2010), for example, investigate stocks with lower levels of short
interest and find that they outperform stocks heavily shorted. Returns to the portfolio of lightly
shorted stocks are greater in absolute value than the returns to the portfolio of heavily shorted
stocks. Heavily traded stocks with lower levels of short interest experience positive abnormal
returns. Their results that short sellers avoid undervalued securities and sell overvalued securities
indicate low levels of short interest could be good news for stock returns. Additionally,
Figlewski (1981) finds that stocks with more short interest underperform stocks lightly shorted.
Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2008) also find that heavily shorted stocks underperform lightly
shorted stocks. Unlike Boehmer, Huszer, and Jordan’s study, where short sellers intentionally
avoid undervalued securities, OTC securities, as a whole, are simply difficult to short at all
(AST, 2013).
Hypothesis 6:

Stocks with lower levels of short interest will outperform stocks with

higher levels of short interest.
Due to data limitations regarding reverse stock splits and dividend payouts, I consider
only daily returns and examine the percentage of all trading days during the sample period that
firm has a positive, negative, or zero return day. Since some OTC securities are extremely
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illiquid and do not trade every day, I analyze firm performance using the open-to-close price
range expressed as a percentage of the open price. This return calculation is similar to what is
used to analyze IPO returns (e.g., Loughran and McDonald, 2013). While positive/negative
return days may follow daily market trends, I mitigate some of this concern by comparing
differences in return days by tier.

In other words, since most OTC firms are subject to

systematic risk, differences in return days in one tier relative to another tier could be attributed
specifically to the firms and tiers and not market-wide movements.
I present my exploration of Hypothesis 6 in Table 7. I partition my sample in short
interest quartiles, where Q4 (Q1) represents firms with the most (least) short interest. I then
compare the difference in positive return days, zero return days, and negative return days within
the top and bottom short interest quartiles. Panel A presents the percentage of positive, negative,
and zero return days according to short interest quartiles. Firms with the highest levels of short
interest experience positive returns on 28% of trading days, whereas firms in the lowest short
interest quartile only earn positive returns on 14% of trading days. It is worth noting the
overwhelming proportion of zero return days for firms within each short interest quartile. Firms
in Q4 (Q1) have identical opening and closing prices over 40% of the days in the sample.
Perhaps the lack of daily price movement helps explain the insignificant relation between short
interest and daily price volatility presented in previous tables.
In Panel B, I compare differences in return days between Q4 and Q1. I find that firms
with more short interest (Q4) have more positive return days than firms with less short interest
(Q1). While Panel B compares return days between quartiles, Panel C compares positive return
days with negative return days for firms within the same short interest quartile. The differences
between positive and negative return days are significant in Q2 and Q3, but insignificant in Q1
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and Q4. These results considered jointly with those in Panel B indicate that firms with higher
levels of short interest have more positive return days than firms with lower levels of short
interest. However, firms within each quartile appear equally likely to have a positive or negative
return day.
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SHORT INTEREST AND CAVEAT EMPTOR FLAG
OTC Markets Group identifies securities within each tier that are subject to a stock spam
campaign, fraud or criminal investigation, undisclosed corporate actions (e.g. reverse merger,
stock split, name change), or a trading suspension/halt (among other reasons) with a “Caveat
Emptor” (i.e. buyer beware) flag. Investors are encouraged to exercise additional caution and
perform a thorough examination of securities with this flag before investing. Bruggemann, Kaul,
Leuz, and Werner (2013) find that the Caveat Emptor label is directly related to crash risk (i.e.
negative return skewness). Consequently, I present the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 7: Short interest decreases for firms receiving a Caveat Emptor designation.
Panel A of Table 8 presents a difference in (short interest) means test between firms with
a Caveat Emptor flag relative to firms that do not have a Caveat Emptor flag. I examine 495
firms in the sample that have a Caveat Emptor flag and find that firms with this identification
have similar levels of short interest than firms without this indicator flag. To specifically address
Hypothesis 7, I perform an event study by examining 283 firms that receive a Caveat Emptor
designation during the sample period. Given the nature of bimonthly reporting of short interest,
my empirical setup favors a non-result for firms that may only temporarily receive the buyer
beware flag. Panel B shows that short interest decreases for firms receiving the Caveat Emptor
designation. Perhaps this result, in support of Hypothesis 7, shouldn’t come as a surprise given
that a large portion of these Caveat Emptor securities trade in sub-penny increments below $0.01
(Davis, 2015). However, as seen in Figure 1, some penny stocks trading in subpennies still
display some level of investor disagreement (i.e. have shares available for shorting).
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I also include a Caveat Emptor dummy variable in the multivariate analysis. I report the
coefficient results of this analysis in Panel B of Table 8. The coefficient of Caveat Emptor is not
statistically different from zero suggesting that firms receiving the “buyer beware” flag have
similar levels of short interest as firms that do not receive this indicator flag.

All other

coefficients reported in Table 8 are identical to those reported in Table 6.

Although

Bruggemann, Kaul, Leuz, and Werner (2013) control for the buyer beware flag in their analyses,
the Caveat Emptor dummy variable does not appear to be a critical control variable in my study
of short interest.
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CHANGES IN SHORT INTEREST
The last portion of my analysis studies firms that have the largest change in short interest
over the sample period. Examining firms with extreme variation in short interest over the sample
period may provide additional support to what is reported in previous tables. I take the range
between each firm’s maximum short interest value and minimum short interest value over the
sample period and divide it by shares outstanding. I next partition the sample into quartiles based
on changes in short interest. Q4 (Q1) represents firms with the largest (smallest) change over the
sample period. I then examine the makeup of the firms within each quartile.
In Figure 2, I show that over 75% of the firms with the largest range in short interest over
the sample period (i.e. Q4 bars) trade in the OTC Pink tier and the Grey Market. Regardless of
the quartile, Pink and Grey firms tend to make up the largest portion of each quartile. However,
short interest in OTCQX and OTCQB firms remains relatively stable over time. As seen in
Figure 3, firms with the largest (smallest) changes in short interest tend to be higher priced
(lower priced) OTC securities.
Perhaps firms with the largest changes in short interest have higher daily returns than
firms that have relatively stable levels of short interest. The empirical design to address this
question is similar to what is presented in Table 7. This time, though, I examine median daily
percentage returns according to quartiles (that are based on changes in short interest over the
sample period). The results of this analysis are reported in Table 9. I scale changes in short
interest by shares outstanding and let Q4 (Q1) represent firms with the largest (smallest) changes
in short interest over the sample period. The median return for firms that have the largest
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changes in short interest is -0.02%, whereas firms will stable levels of short interest have a
median daily return of almost 0.20%. However, the difference between these two quartiles, and
all other quartiles, is not significantly different from zero. While I do not find any relation
between firms’ changes in short interest and daily returns, these results are in line with Diamond
and Verrecchia (1987) who state that in the presence short selling difficulties, rational investors
may

modify

their

valuations
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accordingly.

CONCLUSION
Short selling in the OTC market is “difficult, expensive, and rare” (AST, 2013). Previous
literature suggests that the difficulty shorting OTC securities, at least in part, explains the
observed negative average returns and adds to the lottery-like characteristics of these securities
(Eraker and Ready, 2015; Bruggemann, Kaul, Leuz, and Werner, 2013). In this paper I examine
short interest in OTC stocks by price, tier, and stock and firm characteristics to determine the
effects of transparency on short selling in the OTC market. I also study the daily return
performances of securities with differing levels of short interest to determine if OTC securities
behaves as predicted by a theoretical model provided by Ang, Shtauber, and Tetlock (2013). I
find that larger, more liquid stocks, and stocks in lower information tiers, are easier to short.
Lastly, American Depository Receipts (ADRS) are more difficult to short than are common
stocks and ordinary shares.
Bruggemann, Kaul, Leuz, and Werner (2013) state that if the OTC market consists of
retail investors seeking lottery-like payoffs, then together with restrictions on short selling,
sophisticated investors may not be willing to participate in the market. Coupled with liquidity
concerns in this marketplace, my results provide support for Eraker and Ready (2015) who
suggest that the difficulty shorting OTC stocks adds to the lottery-like feature of these securities.
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Table 1: Sample & Descriptive Statistics
Panel A classifies the sample of securities by security type and tier designation. Ordinary Shares are
common stock of foreign companies. American Depository Receipts (ADRs) are issued by a U.S.
depository bank and provide investors the opportunity to own and trade international securities in U.S.
dollars during normal U.S. trading hours. Firms on OTCQX meet the highest standards. OTCQB firms
are current in their reporting, but do not qualify for OTCQX. OTC Pink firms are either unable or willing
to provide adequate levels of information and transparency. Securities not quoted on OTC Link ATS or
on OTCBB and are designated to the Grey Market. Panel B provides summary statistics. Short Interest is
the number of shares sold short for a security divided by shares outstanding, expressed as a percent. PNT
is the percentage of days during the sample period that a security does not trade. Price is share price. #
Trades is the number of trades in each security by day. Range is daily high price minus daily low price
divided by closing price, expressed as a percentage. Market Cap is price multiplied by shares outstanding
and is reported in millions. Each variable is found at the security level first and then averaged.
Panel A
OTCQX

OTCQB

OTC Pink

Grey

Other

Total

Common Stock
Ordinary Shares
ADRs

31
128
96

1262
106
5

1592
1116
957

83
1213
21

1076
445
45

4,044
3,008
1,124

Total

255

1,373

3,665

1,317

1,566

8,176

Mean

P25

Median

P75

sigma

0.0709
49.96
8.59
11.23
6.84
4,269,790

0.0003
16.47
0.05
1.80
0.47
2,682

0.0029
55.08
0.67
3.08
2.48
26,303

0.0211
81.89
9.10
8.06
10.44
1,498,595

0.2485
33.65
18.05
24.39
9.25
13,535,126

Panel B
Short Interest %
PNT
Price
# Trades
Range
Market Cap
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Table 2: Differences in Short Interest between Market Quality Quartiles
Panel A presents average short interest classified according to differing market quality metric. Panel B
(Panel C) tests the differences in means of short interest within the different market quality metric
quartiles. Short Interest is the number of shares sold short for a security divided by shares outstanding,
expressed as a percent, averaged by firm over the sample period. Volatility is daily high price minus daily
low price divided by closing price, expressed as a percentage; PNT is the percentage of days during the
sample period that a security does not trade; # Trades is the number of trades in each security by day. In
Panel C, $1.00 and $5.00 represent different penny stock price thresholds. All variables are trimmed at the
1% and 99% levels.
Panel A
Volatility
PNT
# Trades
Panel B
Volatility
PNT
# Trades
Panel C
$1.00
$5.00

Q4
0.1477
0.6164
0.3108

Q3
0.0975
0.1144
0.0697

Q2
0.3522
0.1254
0.105

Q1
0.537
0.2799
0.6496

Q4
0.1477
0.6164
0.3108

Q1
0.537
0.2799
0.6496

Diff
-0.3893*
0.3364
0.3388

t-stat
-1.93
1.35
-1.34

Under
0.1059
0.1761

Over
0.4887
0.5054

Diff
-0.3828***
-0.3293*

t-stat
-2.81
-1.81

*** Statistically significant at the 0.01 level; ** Statistically significant at the 0.05 level; * Statistically significant at the 0.10
level
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Table 3: Short Interest and Lottery Characteristics
This table presents results of aggregated variables for each firm over the entire sample period using a
Tobit analysis. Short Interest, the dependent variable, is the number of shares sold short for a security
divided by shares outstanding, expressed as a percent. PNT (percentage of days with no trading) is the
dependent variable. Price is average price. # Trades is the average number of trades per day. Range is the
average of the daily high price minus low price divided by the closing price expressed as a percentage.
Mkt Cap is the log of share price multiplied by shares outstanding. SEC is an indicator variable equal to
one if the firm is registered with the SEC, zero otherwise. <$1.00 is a dummy variable indicating whether
the security is priced below one dollar. All variables are trimmed at the 1% and 99% levels. Robust tstatistics are reported in parentheses.
𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑃𝑁𝑇𝑖 + 𝛽2 #𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 #𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽4 #𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽5 log(𝑀𝑘𝑡𝐶𝑎𝑝)𝑖 + 𝛽6 𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑖
+ 𝛽7 𝐷𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟 + 𝜀𝑖

PNT
Price
# Trades
Range
MktCap (log)
SEC

(1)
Short Interest
-0.0007***
(-6.074)
0.0001
(0.863)
0.0006**
(2.558)
0.0002
(0.468)
0.0114***
(10.364)
0.0137**
(2.076)

< $1.00
Constant
Observations

-0.1246***
(-5.495)
8,128

(2)
Short Interest
-0.0007***
(-6.141)

0.0005**
(2.513)
0.0008*
(1.763)
0.0065***
(5.005)
0.0157**
(2.381)
-0.0649***
(-6.646)
-0.0062
(-0.208)
8,128

*** Statistically significant at the 0.01 level; ** Statistically significant at the 0.05 level; * Statistically significant at the 0.10
level
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Table 4: Differences in Short Interest by Security Type
Panel A presents differences in means tests of short interest between differing security types. Panel B
presents results of aggregated variables for each firm over the entire sample period using a Tobit analysis.
Short Interest, the dependent variable is the number of shares sold short for a security divided by shares
outstanding, expressed as a percent. PNT (percentage of days with no trading) is the dependent variable.
Price is average price. # Trades is the average number of trades per day. Range is the average of the daily
high price minus low price divided by the closing price expressed as a percentage. Mkt Cap is the log of
share price multiplied by shares outstanding. SEC is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm is
registered with the SEC, zero otherwise. <$1.00 is a dummy variable indicating whether the security is
priced below one dollar. ADR is an indicator variable equal to one if the security is an ADR, zero
otherwise. American Depository Receipts (ADRs) are issued by a U.S. depository bank and provide
investors the opportunity to own and trade international securities in U.S. dollars during normal U.S.
trading hours. All variables are trimmed at the 1% and 99% levels. Robust t-statistics are reported in
parentheses.
𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑃𝑁𝑇𝑖 + 𝛽2 #𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 #𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽4 #𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽5 log(𝑀𝑘𝑡𝐶𝑎𝑝)𝑖 + 𝛽6 𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑖
+ 𝛽7 𝐷𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟 + 𝛽8 𝐴𝐷𝑅𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖

Panel A: Short Interest by ADRs
ADR?
Yes
0.1337
Panel B: Tobit Analysis
PNT
Price
# Trades
Range
MktCap (log)
SEC

No
0.3085
Short Interest
-0.0008***
(-7.232)
0.0001
(0.819)
0.0009***
(4.401)
0.0001
(0.261)
0.0182***
(13.810)
-0.0004
(-0.060)

< $1.00
ADR
Constant
Observations

-0.1718***
(-15.900)
-0.2158***
(-8.533)
8,128

Diff
t-stat
-0.17487
-1.49
Short Interest
-0.0008***
(-7.364)

0.0009***
(4.447)
0.0009*
(1.754)
0.0126***
(8.851)
0.0015
(0.223)
-0.0764***
(-7.777)
-0.1783***
(-16.543)
-0.0787**
(-2.527)
8,128

*** Statistically significant at the 0.01 level; ** Statistically significant at the 0.05 level; * Statistically significant at the 0.10
level
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Table 5: Differences in Short Interest by Tier
This table presents differences in means of short interest by tier designation. Short Interest is the number
of shares sold short for a security divided by shares outstanding, expressed as a percent, averaged over the
sample period. Firms on OTCQX meet the highest standards. OTCQB firms are current in their reporting,
but do not qualify for OTCQX. OTC Pink firms are either unable or willing to provide adequate levels of
information and transparency. Securities not quoted on OTC Link ATS or on OTCBB and are designated
to the Grey Market. All variables are trimmed at the 1% and 99% levels.
OTCQX
0.0874

OTCQB
0.1166

0.0874
0.0874

OTC Pink

Grey

0.2042
0.7387
0.1166
0.1166

0.2042
0.2042

0.7387
0.7387

Diff
-0.0292
0.1168***
-0.6513*
-0.0876*
-0.6221*
-0.5345

t-stat
-0.45
-2.59
-1.92
-1.78
-1.83
-1.57

*** Statistically significant at the 0.01 level; ** Statistically significant at the 0.05 level; * Statistically significant at the 0.10
level

152

APPENDIX 6: SHORT INTEREST AND TIER DESIGNATION REGRESSIONS

153

Table 6: Short Interest & Tier Designation Regressions
This table presents results of aggregated variables for each firm over the entire sample period using a
Tobit analysis. Short Interest, the dependent variable is the number of shares sold short for a security
divided by shares outstanding, expressed as a percent. PNT (percentage of days with no trading) is the
dependent variable. Price is average price. # Trades is the average number of trades per day. Range is the
average of the daily high price minus low price divided by the closing price expressed as a percentage.
Mkt Cap is the log of share price multiplied by shares outstanding. SEC is an indicator variable equal to
one if the firm is registered with the SEC, zero otherwise. <$1.00 is a dummy variable indicating whether
the security is priced below one dollar. ADR is an indicator variable equal to one if the security is an
ADR, zero otherwise. OTCQB, OTC Pink and Grey are dummy variables equal to one if the security is
designated to the OTCQB, OTC Pink, or Grey tier/market, respectively, zero otherwise. All variables are
trimmed at the 1% and 99% levels. Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑃𝑁𝑇𝑖 + 𝛽2 #𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 #𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽4 #𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽5 log(𝑀𝑘𝑡𝐶𝑎𝑝)𝑖 + 𝛽6 𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑖
+ 𝛽7 𝐷𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟 + 𝛽8 𝐴𝐷𝑅𝑖 + 𝛽9 𝑂𝑇𝐶𝑄𝐵𝑖 + 𝛽10 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑘𝑖 + 𝛽11 𝐺𝑟𝑒𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖

Short Interest
-0.0010***
(-8.341)
0.0001
(0.856)
0.0009***
(4.281)
-0.0001
(-0.217)
0.0173***
(12.731)
0.0180**
(2.279)

PNT
Price
# Trades
Range
Mkt Cap (log)
SEC
< $1.00
ADR

-0.1681***
(-13.686)
-0.0185**
(-2.203)
0.0174**
(2.202)
0.0478***
(3.924)
-0.2077***
(-7.638)
8,128

OTCQB
OTC Pink
Grey
Constant
Observations

Short Interest
-0.0010***
(-8.657)

0.0009***
(4.350)
0.0006
(1.211)
0.0110***
(7.503)
0.0262***
(3.302)
-0.0857***
(-8.483)
-0.1780***
(-14.500)
-0.0320***
(-3.758)
0.0204***
(2.602)
0.0505***
(4.159)
-0.0517
(-1.585)
8,128

*** Statistically significant at the 0.01 level; ** Statistically significant at the 0.05 level; * Statistically significant at the 0.10
level
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Table 7: Positive and Negative Return Days
I partition my sample in short interest quartiles, where Q4 (Q1) represents firms with the most (least) short interest. I then compare the difference in positive
return days, zero return days, and negative return days within the top and bottom short interest quartiles. Panel A presents the percentage of positive, negative,
and zero return days according to short interest quartiles. Panel B compares return days between the top and bottom quartiles. Panel C compares positive return
days with negative return days within the same short interest quartiles. Firms on OTCQX meet the highest standards. OTCQB firms are current in their reporting,
but do not qualify for OTCQX. OTC Pink firms are either unable or willing to provide adequate levels of information and transparency. Securities not quoted on
OTC Link ATS or on OTCBB and are designated to the Grey Market. Panel C partitions the sample into short interest quartiles and calculates a difference in
means test in percentage return days. Q4 (Q1) represents firms with more (less) short interest. Panel D compares differences in positive return days and negative
return days based on short interest quartiles. All variables are trimmed at the 1% and 99% levels.

% Positive Return Days
% Zero Return Days
% Negative Return Days
Panel B
% Positive Return Days
% Zero Return Days
% Negative Return Days
Panel C

Short Interest Q4
Short Interest Q3
Short Interest Q2
Short Interest Q1

Short Q4
28.64
41.93
29.43

Short Q3
30.10
42.10
27.80

Short Q2
24.88
53.12
22.00

Short Q1
14.53
70.24
15.22

Short Q4
28.64
41.93
29.43

Short Q1
14.53
70.24
15.22

Diff
14.10***
-28.31***
14.21***

t-stat
28.26
-32.69
27.81

% Positive Return
Days
28.64
30.10
24.88
14.53

% Negative Return Days
29.43
27.80
22.00
15.22

Diff
-0.7953
2.30***
2.89***
-0.69

t-stat
-1.38
4.74
6.41
-1.64

*** Statistically significant at the 0.01 level; ** Statistically significant at the 0.05 level; * Statistically significant at the 0.10 level

156

Panel A

APPENDIX 8: CAVEAT EMPTOR

157

Table 8: Caveat Emptor
OTC Markets Group identifies securities within each tier that are subject to a stock spam campaign, fraud or criminal
investigation, undisclosed corporate actions (e.g. reverse merger, stock split, name change), or a trading suspension/halt (among
other reasons) with a “Caveat Emptor” (i.e. buyer beware) flag. Investors are encouraged to “exercise additional care and perform
thorough due diligence” when investing in securities with this flag. The first portion of Panel A presents differences in means
tests of short interest between firms with and without Caveat Emptor flags. The second portion of Panel A reports a difference in
short interest means test comparing short interest in firms before versus after receiving the Caveat Emptor flag. Panel B reports
the results of a Tobit Analysis. Short Interest, the dependent variable is the number of shares sold short for a security divided by
shares outstanding, expressed as a percent. PNT (percentage of days with no trading) is the dependent variable. Price is average
price. # Trades is the average number of trades per day. Range is the average of the daily high price minus low price divided by
the closing price expressed as a percentage. Mkt Cap is the log of share price multiplied by shares outstanding. SEC is an
indicator variable equal to one if the firm is registered with the SEC, zero otherwise. <$1.00 is a dummy variable indicating
whether the security is priced below one dollar. ADR is an indicator variable equal to one if the security is an ADR, zero
otherwise. OTCQB, OTC Pink and Grey are dummy variables equal to one if the security is designated to the OTCQB, OTC
Pink, or Grey tier/market, respectively, zero otherwise. Caveat Emptor is a binary variable equal to one if the firm receives a
Caveat Emptor designation during the sample period, zero otherwise. All variables are trimmed at the 1% and 99% levels.
Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑃𝑁𝑇𝑖 + 𝛽2 #𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 #𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽4 #𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽5 log(𝑀𝑘𝑡𝐶𝑎𝑝)𝑖 + 𝛽6 𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑖 + 𝛽7 𝐷𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟
+ 𝛽8 𝐴𝐷𝑅𝑖 + 𝛽9 𝑂𝑇𝐶𝑄𝐵𝑖 + 𝛽10 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑘𝑖 + 𝛽11 𝐺𝑟𝑒𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽11 𝐶𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑎𝑡𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖
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Panel A: Short Interest by Caveat Emptor
Does firm have Buyer Beware Flag?

Yes

No

Diff

t-stat

Short Interest %

0.1010

0.2947

-0.1937**

-2.42

Before Receiving Flag

After Receiving Flag

Diff

t-stat

0.0646

0.0290

0.0355*

1.73

Panel B: Event Study
Short Interest %
Panel C: Tobit Analysis
PNT

Short Interest

Short Interest

-0.0010***

-0.0010***

(-8.316)

(-8.609)

Price

0.0002
(0.891)

# Trades

0.0009***

0.0009***

(4.297)

(4.372)

Range

Mkt Cap (log)

-0.0001

0.0006

(-0.152)

(1.289)

0.0172***

0.0107***

(12.459)

(7.191)

0.0183**

0.0267***

(2.309)

(3.346)

-0.1678***

-0.1775***

SEC

ADR

(-13.605)
< $1.00

(-14.429)
-0.0862***
(-8.471)

OTCQB

-0.0194**
(-2.289)

(-3.868)

OTC Pink

0.0171**

0.0200**

(2.167)

(2.554)

0.0477***

0.0502***

(3.912)

(4.142)

-0.0116

-0.0172

(-0.865)

(-1.285)

Grey

Caveat Emptor

Constant

-0.0335***

-0.2049***

-0.0470

(-7.467)

(-1.415)

8,128

8,128

Observations

*** Statistically significant at the 0.01 level; ** Statistically significant at the 0.05 level; * Statistically significant at the 0.10
level
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Table 9 Median Returns
Panel A presents the median percentage daily returns of firms partitioned according to changes in short interest over the period. I first
take the range of each firm’s high short interest value and low short interest value over the sample period and divide it by shares outstanding. I
then partition the sample into quartiles, where Q4 (Q1) represents firms with the largest (smallest) range. Panel A presents the medians by quartile.
Panel B tests the difference in the medians between the differing quartiles. Median % Daily Return is the median daily return percentage,
averaged across firms.

Median % Daily Returns
Panel B
Median % Daily Returns
Median % Daily Returns
Median % Daily Returns
Median % Daily Returns
Median % Daily Returns
Median % Daily Returns

Q4
-0.0036

Q3
0.1059

Q2
0.0839

Q1
0.0017

Q4
-0.0036
-0.0036
-0.0036

Q3

Q2

Q1
0.0017

0.0839
0.1059
0.1059
0.1059

0.0839
0.0839

0.0017
0.0017
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Panel A

Diff
-0.0053
-0.0875
-0.1095
0.02
0.1042
0.0822

t-stat
-0.15
-1.38
-1.62
0.25
1.49
1.25

*** Statistically significant at the 0.01 level; ** Statistically significant at the 0.05 level; * Statistically significant at the 0.10 level; *

APPENDIX 10: SHORT INTEREST BY FIRM PRICE
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Figure 1 Short Interest by Firm Price
This figure reports short interest percentages by price. Short Interest, the dependent variable is
the number of shares sold short for a security divided by shares outstanding, expressed as a
percent.
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Figure 2 Firms by Short Interest Quartile and Tier
This figure reports the percentage of firms within each (change in) short interest quartile, by tier. I first
take the range of each firm’s high short interest value and low short interest value over the sample period
and divide it by shares outstanding. I then partition the sample into quartiles, where Q4 (Q1) represents
firms with the largest (smallest) range. I then categorize each quartile according to tier. Firms on OTCQX
meet the highest standards. OTCQB firms are current in their reporting, but do not qualify for OTCQX.
OTC Pink firms are either unable or willing to provide adequate levels of information and transparency.
Securities not quoted on OTC Link ATS or on OTCBB and are designated to the Grey Market.
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Figure 3 Firms by Short Interest Quartile and Price
This figure reports the percentage of firms within each (change in) short interest quartile, by price. I first
take the range of each firm’s high short interest value and low short interest value over the sample period
and divide it by shares outstanding. I then partition the sample into quartiles, where Q4 (Q1) represents
firms with the largest (smallest) range. I then categorize each quartile according to price.
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